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1. Introduction 
 
This work is (ultimately) concerned with the concepts of ontological category and system 
of categories. On what basis should ontological categories be taken to ‘categorize’? In 
what way or ways do categories1 form a system? What categories of entities we should 
recognize, and what precise form the system in which they are embedded should take, 
are, on the other hand, not questions I will be concerned with here. This is more a work 
in ‘metaontology’ or ‘metametaphysics’ than in ontology or metaphysics proper.2 
 
The revival of metaphysics in recent decades has not in general been a revival of the 
theory of categories, although there are several notable exceptions (e.g. Chisholm 1996, 
Hoffman and Rosenkrantz 1994, Lowe 2006, Johansson 1989, Thomasson 1999, and 
Grossmann 1983). On the other hand, categories in some form or other, i.e. the basic types 
of entities, are arguably an essential concern of metaphysics. Thus, even those 
metaphysicians who do not put forward and articulate an explicit category system can 
still plausibly be expected to have an implicit and tacit one which could be gleaned from 
their work, and which structures their metaphysical theories and ontological 
commitments. 
 
Correspondingly, there has been relative inattention towards the very concepts of 
ontological category and category system3. Perhaps the most extensive literature has 
accumulated around the idea of ‘category mistake’ and the concept of ‘category’ involved 
in it (see Magidor 2013 and the bibliography there). The idea of ‘category mistake’ is 
usually associated with Gilbert Ryle (see in particular his 1938/2009: 178–93), but can 
be traced back to the work of Husserl (1921, Investigation IV)4. My own understanding 
of categories will be broadly speaking Aristotelian. In particular, this means that, unlike 
the Ryleans (or, for that matter, Fregeans or Kantians), I am not interested in the category 
                                                          
1
 I will drop the qualification ‘ontological’ and just talk of ‘categories’ unless the context requires 
disambiguation. 
2
 The questions I am concerned with in this work, though, do not have much to do with what has recently 
been much discussed in works that come under these two rubrics (see in particular Chalmers et al. 2009) 
— namely, existence, quantification, and ontological commitment. 
3
 Westerhoff 2005 is perhaps the most extensive recent treatment. Most works, like the ones cited above, 
that present a system of categories also include material on categories and category systems in general. 
The work of Peter Simons and David Woodruff Smith (see bibliography) should also be mentioned here. 
4
 Other conceptions of ‘category’ include the Kantian one and the Fregean one, neither of which I will 
discuss (see Thomasson 2013). 
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schemes involved in natural language or cognition. Instead, categories as I will 
understand them are supposed to be very general classes of entities in the world, and they 
are supposed to mark basic distinctions that are mind- and language-independent. If 
language or cognition enters into this, they will do so only incidentally. 
 
Moreover, the sorts of categories I will ultimately be concerned with are fundamental 
ones, or categories of fundamental or basic entities. The distinction between 
‘fundamental’ and ‘non-fundamental’ entities should be familiar from recent 
metaphysics. In using these terms, one usually has in mind some kind of hierarchical or 
‘stratified’ picture of reality, one on which some things form the ground level — the 
‘fundamental level’ — on which other things are (ultimately) ‘based’ or from which they 
are (ultimately) ‘derived’. (The most familiar example of the relevant sort of hierarchy, 
and of all the complexities involved in such, is perhaps provided by the case of the 
relations between the mental and the physical.) The metaphysician or ‘category theorist’ 
need not be concerned with all the details of this hierarchy — not even with all the details 
of the ‘fundamental level’, which, on the most reasonable view, are to be given by 
fundamental physics. What she should (on my view, at least) be concerned with are the 
ontological categories involved and their relations to each other. But why confine one’s 
attention to the categories of fundamental entities only, as I just proposed to do? Are not 
‘non-fundamental’ entities entities too? This is certainly a reasonable view (see 3.111 
below). Nevertheless, if we can get along without ‘derivative’ or ‘non-fundamental’ 
entities, I think we should; and I think we can, at least on one reasonable way of 
understanding what is ‘fundamental’ and what ‘non-fundamental’.  
 
Fundamentality is sometimes illustrated metaphorically using the idea of creation (see 
e.g. Barnes 2012: 876, Schaffer 2009: 351; the creation metaphor seems to be originally 
from Kripke 1980: 153, although Kripke does not talk about ‘fundamentality’ there): the 
‘fundamental level’ is constituted by those entities that are all God would need to create 
in order to ‘fix’ or determine all the facts or truths about the world. ‘Non-fundamental’ 
entities, if they exist at all, need not have been brought into existence separately, for their 
existence follows with metaphysical necessity from what the fundamental level is like. In 
fact, there would be no way for God to create the fundamental level as it is without at the 
same time bringing into existence the non-fundamental entities. This is perhaps one 
reason why this theological metaphor is so striking: the relation between the fundamental 
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and the non-fundamental is here taken to be so intimate that not even God could 
conceivably sever them from each other. Now, what I would propose is that the 
fundamental or basic entities, the categories of which I will be concerned with, are just 
those that by their mere existence are together sufficient to ‘fix’ or metaphysically 
necessitate all the worldly facts. On this view, then, ‘non-fundamental’ entities would, it 
seems, be completely idle and redundant. Every truth about the world would receive a 
sufficient ontological account in terms of the existence of fundamental entities only. The 
fundamental entities are, in other words, those that constitute the complete and also non-
redundant5 set of truthmakers for all the truths about the world.6 
 
I recognize that this is not the only way to interpret the creation metaphor and to conceive 
of what it would be for God to create the ‘fundamental level’. In particular, one could 
also take the fundamental level to involve fundamental facts that cannot themselves be 
grounded in the existence of entities (something like this was David Lewis’s view of what 
is fundamental; see Hall 2010). The set of fundamental entities would then not be the 
complete and non-redundant set of truthmakers. In fact, there would be no such set on 
this view: worldly truths would not be grounded in the mere existence of fundamental 
entities but also in something like ‘how they are’ (for a very interesting moderate version 
of this view, see Dodd 2002). I am not completely unsympathetic to the basic idea here 
(see 2.34 below for some considerations that could be taken to support it, although I 
follow another course there). Nevertheless, I will adopt the standard truthmaking 
approach in this work. 
 
Several necessary conditions can be given which a classification must meet in order to 
count as categorial. What is most well-known and most often recognized is that a 
categorial classification should be both exhaustive and exclusive, i.e., it should be a 
                                                          
5
 There are, however, at least two caveats about ‘non-redundancy’ here. First, it may be that there are no 
‘minimal truthmakers’, i.e. truthmakers for some truth that have no parts or constituents which themselves 
are truthmakers for that truth. If this turned out to be the case, then either the ‘fundamental level’ of 
truthmakers would always be redundant because however one would restrict it, while retaining 
sufficiency, it would always have a further restriction that was also sufficient; or, alternatively, one would 
have to arbitrarily exclude some ‘smaller’ truthmakers, from some point onwards, from the ‘fundamental 
level’. Second, as I will discuss further in 3.111 below, some entities that are ‘redundant’ in that they are 
not needed to necessitate truths may nevertheless have to be admitted (because they are in fact not 
‘redundant’ in another sense of that term) when ‘essential’ or ‘hyperintensional’ considerations are taken 
into account. 
6
 I say ‘all the truths about the world’ and not ‘all the truths’ in order to allow for there to be truths that 
have no truthmakers, e.g. the logical truths. 
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partition of what is classified: everything should have a category, and nothing should 
have more than one. A scheme of ontological categories should, first of all, have a place 
for everything (at least for every fundamental or basic entity); this is perhaps perfectly 
obvious: it just is the purpose of a scheme of ontological categories to classify 
‘everything’ or all entities (again, at the fundamental level at least), and, as one writer 
puts it, it is in general an essential feature of good classifications or taxonomies that they 
‘subsume all the entities they purport to subsume’ (Jansen 2008: 160). Category schemes 
often try to guarantee exhaustiveness by proposing to divide all entities by some sort of 
dichotomy (see e.g. Hoffman and Rosenkranz 1994: 14–16, Lowe 2006: 38–39, and 
Chisholm 1992: 1–2). Secondly, categories should be mutually exclusive or ‘pairwise 
disjoint’. This condition is clearly met when categories are conceived, in the terms of the 
Aristotelian tradition, as the ‘highest genera’ that have nothing in common. But many 
contemporary category schemes in fact include ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ categories (see e.g. 
Hoffman and Rosenkranz 1994: 18, Chisholm 1992: 1), so that not all categories are 
‘pairwise disjoint’ as some include others. Nevertheless, even in these systems all 
categories of the same level of generality are mutually exclusive; also, one may take the 
division at only one of the levels to be the properly ‘categorial’ one (so Lowe, for 
example, takes the division of entities into universals and particulars to be 
‘transcategorial’ and not ‘basic’ (2006: 21)). 
 
Another necessary condition that is not explicitly mentioned so often is that categories 
should be essential to their members (see at least Meixner 2004: 20). That is, nothing can, 
at least, change its category, nor could anything have been, counterfactually, of another 
category. The sense of essentiality involved in this formulation is, however, rather weak. 
I may note here that I believe it is in general advisable to use a stronger concept of essence. 
In particular, modal notions seem to be too coarse-grained to capture certain essential 
connections between entities (essential connections or essential relations will be much 
discussed in this work). The need for a stronger notion of essence has been illustrated by 
Kit Fine by means of the following example (see K. Fine 1994: 4–5): plausibly, Socrates 
and {Socrates} (i.e. the singleton of Socrates) have a mutual necessary connection, i.e. 
that necessarily, if either one of them exists then it is true that Socrates is a member of 
{Socrates}; but, on the other hand, it seems that they are not mutually essentially 
connected, in some important sense of ‘essentially’; for (so Fine claims and it is indeed 
plausible) while it is somehow ‘part of the essence’ of {Socrates} to be related (by the 
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membership relation) to Socrates, it is not ‘part of the essence’ of Socrates to be 
conversely related to {Socrates}. The concept of essence that Fine introduces (or re-
introduces; Fine takes himself to be following a traditional approach to essence) to solve 
such problems is one based on the idea of ‘objectual’ or ‘real definition’ (ibid.). Just as a 
linguistic definition says what an expression means, so a ‘real definition’ gives the 
essence or ‘what it is’ of an object (indeed, Fine believes that a linguistic definition is just 
a special case of a ‘real’ one: it gives the essence of a meaning; see ibid.: 13). Following 
such a notion of essence, then, we can say that the category of an entity determines an 
important part of its essence or ‘what it is’, or forms a part of its ‘real definition’.  
 
The idea of ‘ontological category’ as thus constrained forms the background to this work. 
In the first of the two central chapters I will look at the idea that ontology is concerned 
with certain (putatively) ‘formal’ notions; I will attempt to clarify what ‘formal’ is 
supposed to mean in this context. This idea in fact suggests an answer to the first question 
I put at the beginning: what ontological categories categorize ‘by’ are certain ‘formal’ 
features of entities. The ‘formal’ features of entities that ontology studies are frequently 
taken to be certain relations, the so-called ‘formal ontological’ ones. The second central 
chapter connects such ‘formal ontological relations’ more closely with categories and 
categorial distinctions. The chapter looks — through the example of one particular 
category system, the Ontological Square — at two different ways in which relations can 
assume a central role in a category system; on both ways the relations are taken to 
determine or ‘generate’ (a part of) the category system. 
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2. Ontological form 
 
In this chapter, I will introduce the ideas of ‘ontological form’ and of ‘formal ontological 
relation’. I will first examine one widespread view of the distinction between the ‘formal’ 
and ‘material’ in ontology that has also been applied to the analogous distinction in logic. 
I will then focus on what have been called ‘formal’ or ‘formal ontological relations’ and 
try, in particular, to extract a criterion for such relations from the literature. 
 
2.1 Formal ontology and formal logic 
 
Metaphysics or ontology is supposed to be a highly general, even the most general, sort 
of investigation into being or reality, and ontological categories, correspondingly, are 
supposed to be very general, or the most general, classes of entities. So far so good; but 
if one tries to derive from this a characterization of the subject-matter of ontology, or of 
the theory of categories, I don’t think one will get anything very useful as a result. 
Generality admits of degrees and is thus often vague. Absolute generality is perhaps a 
different matter. But to characterize ontology merely as an investigation of the absolutely 
general features of reality seems to be in tension with the idea of ontological categories; 
for ontological categories, even if they are a very general matter, are yet not absolutely 
general, for their role is precisely to mark fundamental distinctions (see however the 
section below on topic-neutrality). Generality is without doubt a characteristic of the 
subject-matter of ontology; ontology does study something ‘universal’ and ‘wide-spread’ 
in reality. But the subject-matter of ontology is not, I think, constituted by its generality. 
One could take there to be a different sort of distinction at the bottom, distinction not 
between what is and what is not ‘general’, but one between ‘formal’ and ‘material’: 
ontology, the suggestion would go, is formal ontology. 
 
One talks of ‘formal ontology’ in, roughly, at least two ways, depending on what 
‘formality’ is supposed to be (these ways of understanding ‘formal ontology’ are 
nevertheless by no means incompatible). Perhaps most commonly today, ‘formal 
ontology’ refers to a theory of entities (e.g. the theory of entities as parts and wholes, or 
mereology) which is formulated in a certain way, namely ‘formally’ and axiomatically, 
using the resources of logic or mathematics (see e.g. Hofweber 2011, Sect. 4.3; 
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Cocchiarella 2007). Here ‘formality’ means the ‘formality’ of ‘formal’, artificial 
languages or of ‘formal systems’. In another sense, one talks of ‘formal ontology’ as a 
theory, or as the discipline that aims at a theory, of certain (‘formal’) aspects or ‘moments’ 
of entities, whether formulated ‘informally’ or ‘formally’ (Husserl 1913a, 1913b, 1921, 
Ingarden 1964; see B. Smith 1978: footnote 11). What ‘formal’ aspects of entities are 
supposed to be is certainly less obvious than what ‘formal’ theories or languages are 
supposed to be. Nevertheless, it is the former, admittedly more obscure sense of ‘formal 
ontology’ that I primarily have in mind. 
 
The ‘formal’ aspects of entities studied by formal ontology can be collectively referred to 
as ontological form.7 But what are these aspects? What belongs to ontological form? To 
anticipate, I take ontological form to be at bottom a matter of certain relations between 
entities or structures formed by these. I will talk of formal ontological relations (as used 
in Lowe 2006, Chapter 3; also in e.g. Smith and Grenon 2004, Schwarz and Smith 2008, 
and Varzi 2010). Indeed, I suppose the question of ‘ontological form’ can be ‘reduced’ to 
the question of ‘formal ontological relations’. To determine what belongs to ‘ontological 
form’, or what the formal ‘aspects’ of entities are, is to determine what relations between 
entities are ‘formal ontological’. This will be one of my concerns in the last part of this 
chapter.  
 
The idea of formal ontology, as the name suggests, is modelled on that of formal logic. 
Indeed, for Husserl — who originated the term — formal ontology was itself part of 
formal logic (Bell 1990: 94). For some more recent formal ontologists of Husserlian 
inspiration (e.g. B. Smith), as well as some of Husserl’s students (e.g. Ingarden), though, 
formal ontology is a discipline distinct and independent from logic. This is how I will 
understand formal ontology here. A certain analogy between the disciplines nevertheless 
remains. 
 
                                                          
7
 The term ‘ontological form’ appears at least in E. J. Lowe (2006: 47–49, 2011: 105–6), David Woodruff 
Smith (2002, 2004: passim.), Barry Smith (1981, 2005), and Jan Westerhoff (2005: 228–29), although 
none of these authors uses the term very systematically. These authors also use the term mostly as a 
countable, instead of an uncountable or collective term as I do here:  they talk mostly of ‘ontological 
forms’ of entities, states of affairs etc. In such a sense, the term ‘ontological form’ seems to refer either to 
particular structures of some kind, or in effect to the categories of entities (see, though, 3.2. below) 
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In what way is formal ontology (insofar as it is not just ontology that uses ‘formal’ 
methods) supposed to be a discipline analogous to formal logic? Well, what is formal 
logic? Why is it ‘formal’? These are themselves controversial questions. Catarina Dutilh 
Novaes (2011), for example, distinguishes two groups of ways in which logic could be 
said to be ‘formal’: ‘formality’ of logic could mean that logic has to do with forms, in 
some sense, or it could mean that it has to do with rules. Insofar as formal logic is taken 
to be concerned with ‘forms’, what makes it ‘formal’ is that it somehow abstracts from 
‘matter’ or ‘content’ (Dutilh Novaes 2011: 306). Formal as pertaining to rules, on the 
other hand, is a matter of laws or norms and strict adherence to them; its opposite is not 
‘material’ or ‘contentual’, but ‘informal’ (ibid.: 321). Now, whichever of these is closer 
to the truth about logic, it is at least clear that it is in the former sort of way that the 
‘formality’ of formal logic is to be understood if formal ontology (as I understand it here) 
is to be modelled on it. For it is precisely the formal-material and not the formal-informal 
–contrast that is relevant here. 
 
If formal ontology is taken to abstract ‘forms’ from ‘matter’ the question of course arises 
as to what the ‘form’-‘matter’ –distinction is supposed to amount to in this case. 
Somehow, the relevant subject-matter — ‘being’ in ontology, language or ‘thought’ 
(perhaps) in logic — is supposed to divide into two parts, the ‘formal’ part and the 
‘material’ part. But where does the line of demarcation go? What is distinctive of ‘form’ 
and what distinctive of ‘matter’ here? Given that ‘form’ is merely ‘what remains once 
matter is removed’ (Dutilh Novaes 2011: 306), the different options here can be surveyed 
by examining the different possible relevant senses of ‘matter’.  Dutilh Novaes again 
gives a useful inventory here. We are of course interested here in those senses which are 
relevant to ontology. According to Dutilh Novaes, ‘matter’ (in particular, of an argument) 
has been used in at least the following senses in logic: it has been used (1) of terms with 
an independent signification; (2) of the things referred to; (3) of the specific subject-
matter in each case; (4) of intentional content; and (5) of meaning in general (ibid.: 306). 
It is obvious that (2) is relevant from our point of view. So is in fact (3). Dutilh Novaes 
takes (2) to be associated in logic with a corresponding sense of ‘formality’ as 
‘indifference to particulars’, i.e. as perfect variability in the entities referred to (ibid.: 306, 
310–14). (3), again, is associated with a view of the ‘formal’ as what is topic-neutral 
(ibid.: 306). Interestingly, Dutilh Novaes claims that this sense of ‘formal’ is the one 
involved in the idea of ‘formal ontology’ (ibid.: 315–16). Although I do not think topic-
10 
 
neutrality (as applicability to all subject-matters or ‘domains’) actually exhausts the 
senses of ‘formal’ in ‘formal ontology’ (however, I admit that the remainder — which 
involves ‘formal’ or ‘formal ontological relations’ in particular — is rather obscure), this 
is basically correct at least as a historical point. The idea that formal ontology is concerned 
with the topic-neutral ontological concepts has indeed been highly influential. In the next 
section, I will further examine the idea of topic-neutrality as a basis for distinguishing the 
‘formal’ from the ‘material’ in ontology. In fact, I will also take ‘indifference to 
particulars’ as a species of topic-neutrality, for it is clearly a cognate idea, and has been 
so treated by other authors. 
 
2.2 Topic-neutrality 
 
Topic-neutrality, applicability to all subject-matter, would indeed seem to provide a 
promising way to understand  the characteristic ‘formality’ of formal logic, and perhaps 
that of formal ontology as well, and thus perhaps to give us a criterion for demarcating 
both logical and ontological form from their respective ‘matters’. But how, precisely, is 
‘topic’ or ‘subject-matter’ to be understood here? 
 
It seems there are at least two ways to understand these rather vague expressions in this 
context. ‘Topic’ and ‘subject-matter’ could be taken to refer to single entities — ‘topic-
neutrality’ would then mean applicability to any entities whatever (this is, in effect, 
‘indifference to particulars’); or, alternatively, the expressions could be understood, 
perhaps more naturally from the point of view of ordinary usage, to refer to something 
like domains of entities (like the ‘subject-matter’ of psychology, physics etc.). 
 
In the philosophy of logic, these two ways correspond, more or less, to the two approaches 
to topic-neutrality John MacFarlane (2009, Sect. 4) distinguishes. One approach takes 
topic-neutrality as ‘indifference to the particular identities of objects’ (loc. cit.). Examples 
of topic-neutral and thus supposedly logical expressions in this sense include the 
predicates ‘is a thing’8 and ‘is identical with’. These predicates, as MacFarlane says, ‘do 
not distinguish between any two particular objects’ (loc. cit.; original italics); that is, one 
                                                          
8
 If you think ‘thing’ sounds too much like the name of a particular category here, replace it in your mind 
with ‘entity’, ‘something’, ‘item’, or whatever you think is the absolutely universal predicate, with the 
universal class as its extension 
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cannot make any distinctions between entities on the basis of them. Take any two entities 
or pairs of entities: the predicates ‘is a thing’ and ‘is identical with’ will apply to them 
with perfect ‘symmetry’ — the way they are true or false of the one, they are true or false 
of the other9. Thus these predicates are clearly different from a predicate like ‘is a dog’ 
which does make a distinction, between dogs and non-dogs, among entities. As 
MacFarlane notes, one can give a precise mathematical formulation to this idea of topic-
neutrality, in terms of invariance under arbitrary permutations of objects in a domain 
(see Tarski 1986; see also MacFarlane 2009, Sect. 5). 
 
It bears noting that ‘topic-neutrality’ in this first sense does not mean that a ‘topic-neutral’ 
predicate would be ‘applicable’ to absolutely everything in the sense that it would have 
to be true of absolutely everything. While the predicate ‘is a thing’ is obviously true of 
absolutely everything, the predicate ‘is identical with’, on the other hand, is obviously not 
so. ‘Is identical with’ is nevertheless permutation invariant. There are two basic 
possibilities as to truth in the application of this predicate. Either it applies to one single 
entity and it is true of it; or it applies to two distinct entities and it is false of them. In the 
first case, every permutation, as a one-one mapping, retains the truth, for it merely 
switches the one identical entity to which it applies. In the second case, every permutation 
(again because it is a one-one mapping) merely exchanges the two entities for another 
pair of entities (it need, of course, merely exchange the two entities for each other) and 
so the predicate is still false of its arguments. We can also note here that (binary) relations 
or relational predicates that are ‘topic-neutral’ in this first sense are one and all 
symmetrical.10 
 
Another approach to the topic-neutrality of logic MacFarlane mentions is through what 
he calls just ‘universal applicability’ (MacFarlane 2009, Sect. 4), but which could perhaps 
more precisely be called application to reasoning in any discipline. On this approach, the 
expressions of arithmetic and set-theory — like ‘is a number’, or even ‘is prime’, and ‘is 
a member of’, which on the previous approach are topic-specific, because they make 
distinctions among entities — turn out to be topic-neutral, because they are plausibly 
                                                          
9
 I limit myself to predicates here because they are most relevant to what I am doing here, and disregard 
the ‘topic-neutrality’ of e.g. quantifiers and connectives 
10
 In fact, there are only four binary relations (on individuals) invariant under all permutations: the 
‘universal’ relation, the ‘empty’ relation, identity, and difference (Tarski 1986: 150). 
12 
 
relevant to any discipline or to discourse about any domain (anything whatever can be 
counted or gathered into sets) (loc. cit.) 
 
Now, without bothering about whether these ideas could actually provide any solution to 
the problem of the demarcation of formal logic, let us look at their significance for the 
analogous problem in formal ontology. There is no doubt that ‘topic-neutrality’ in some 
sense has been thought to be of importance to the characterization of formal ontology. 
Husserl already said of the concepts of formal ontology that they are ‘independent of the 
specificity of all material of knowledge’ and that every other concept must be subsumable 
under them (Husserl 1913b: 244). Several contemporary formal ontologists, again, invoke 
topic-neutrality, now often under that very name (see e.g. Mulligan and Smith 1986: 118, 
Varzi 2010, Correia and Keller 2004). But how, again, should ‘topic’ etc. be understood? 
 
‘Material of knowledge’, which is Husserl’s equivalent of ‘topic’ in the passage cited 
above, is certainly not any less ambiguous a term. So which concept of topic-neutrality 
would have been more relevant to Husserl’s idea of formal ontology? A glimpse at some 
of the items listed as ‘formal objectual categories’ by him at the same place (e.g. object, 
state of affairs, relation) (Husserl 1913b: 244) would seem to confirm (with the apparent 
exception of object) that it is not the first sort of topic-neutrality that is involved — at 
least if we interpret ‘category’ as meaning some sort of kind or type of entity, as we are 
obviously wont to do. But probably we shouldn’t in fact take the word in such a sense 
here. These ‘categories’ would then perhaps rather be ‘independent of the specificity of 
all material of knowledge’ in the sense that anything whatsoever will be — not a state of 
affairs, obviously — but the subject of or involved in a state of affairs; and similarly, 
anything at all will, plausibly, be related or at least relatable to something. Whether this 
interpretation makes the topic-neutrality involved of the first sort depends then on 
whether relations, states of affairs etc. are themselves entities included in the range of 
‘anything’, and on whether the ‘categories’ will then apply in a different way to those 
entities that are e.g. relations and the other entities that merely stand in relations. 
 
Barry Smith, on the other hand, would seem to interpret Husserl as advocating a view of 
formal ontology that rather follows something like the second concept of topic-neutrality 
(according to which ‘topic’ means something like ‘subject-matter’, rather than simply 
‘entity’). He says the structures of Husserl’s formal ontology are ‘domain-independent’ 
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(2005: 156; my italics), that they are realized by objects in ‘all material spheres or 
domains of reality’ (1998: 19; my italics). Now, in fact, the distinction between the two 
concepts of topic-neutrality would seem to be somewhat obscured when brought into the 
Husserlian context, because, for Husserl, entity (or ‘object’) and domain (or ‘region of 
objects’) in a sense coincide. Formal ontology studies the ‘form of region in general’ — 
the ‘form’ that is common to all the different ‘material’ regions, like physical nature —, 
but this, again, is equivalent to the ‘formal essence of object in general’, to which ‘belong’ 
the ‘formal categories’ (like relation or state of affairs) (Husserl 1913a: 21). ‘Object in 
general’, we might say, involves the ‘form’ of a whole ‘region’. While Husserl does call 
relations, states of affairs etc. ‘objects’, yet he also thinks they must be seen as mere 
‘modifications’ (Abwandlungen) of what he calls the ‘primary object’ 
(Urgegenständlichkeit); for example, in the region of physical nature, the material 
‘things’ are the primary objects in relation to which everything else in that region (the 
material properties, relations etc.) is merely ‘derivative’ (loc. cit.). Thus, it seems, if the 
‘primary object’ is the only proper ‘object’ or entity — which does not seem too 
hazardous an inference to draw from the way Husserl’s talks of relations, states of affairs, 
and the rest — then topic-neutrality as applicability to all entities would seem to coincide 
with topic-neutrality as applicability to all domains or material ‘regions’. 
 
Among contemporary writers, some make clear that a ‘topic-neutral’ concept in formal 
ontology is one ‘under which can fall objects of any kind’, e.g. objecthood, existence, and 
identity (Correia and Keller 2004: 276), or that in formal ontology one looks for ‘relations 
that are topic-neutral and take absolutely all possible objects as arguments’ (Varzi 2010: 
6; my italics). Sometimes, again, something more like the second concept of topic-
neutrality seems to be involved in the characterization of the formal ontological. Simons 
(2009: 144, 147), for example, uses the term ‘domain-neutral’ instead of ‘topic-neutral’, 
and some of his examples of relations of this kind (e.g. causation) certainly do not seem 
to take absolutely anything as their possible arguments. D. W. Smith, again, gives as an 
example of a formal ontological distinction Descartes’ one of substance and attribute; this 
distinction, Smith says, was supposed to apply to ‘any substantive or material domain of 
entities’ (D. W. Smith 2004: 256, italics in the original). But, as we might add, it on the 
other hand cannot apply to everything within these domains, but its purpose, of course, is 
precisely to distinguish between the substances and the attributes proper to them. 
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Which approach to topic-neutrality holds more promise in providing a criterion for 
demarcating ‘ontological form’? While I am not sure — unlike, perhaps, some of the 
writers cited above — that topic-neutrality in any sense should be taken as the guiding 
idea in formal ontology, the second concept certainly seems to me better suited to the 
task. The reason is that I believe fundamental categorial distinctions should be included 
in the subject-matter of formal ontology11. It is obvious that the first concept of topic-
neutrality, designed as it precisely is to exclude notions that would make any sort of 
distinction among entities, cannot exhaustively characterize the subject-matter of a 
discipline that aims, among other things, at classifying entities by studying their 
fundamental differences. On the other hand, the second concept merely excludes those 
notions that are restricted to certain well-defined ‘regions’ or ‘spheres’ of being, e.g. the 
physical or the mental. Plausibly, many at least of the traditional categorial notions — 
like universality, particularity, or substantiality — would thereby count as topic-neutral, 
because they are at least supposed to be applicable in the categorization of entities from 
any material domain whatever. I would nevertheless not put too much weight on even this 
second sort of topic-neutrality as a characteristic of ontological form. In addition to being 
somewhat vague, the idea of ‘region’ or well-defined non-arbitrary material domain will 
do no work if it turns out that there is only one such ‘region’. In fact, as we are concerned 
with ‘fundamental’ entities and their categories here, it would be enough if only one 
‘region’ would turn out to be fundamental. And at any rate, if some domains are 
dependent on others (as e.g. the mental on almost any view is somehow dependent on the 
physical) it will at least be unclear whether the notions applicable to one will be applicable 
to another because the latter is dependent on the first.  
 
While I would thus say that neither concept of topic-neutrality is likely to provide a 
satisfactory general way to distinguish ontological form from ‘matter’, both concepts may 
still find a place in the explication of at least some aspects of ontological form. The first 
concept of topic-neutrality can be taken to demarcate something important, even if what 
it demarcates is — in the case of ontological form at least, if not perhaps in that of logical 
form — not all that should be demarcated. Identity and difference, for example, can be 
considered important formal ontological notions (see e.g. Lowe 2006: 48–9), even if they 
                                                          
11
 Note that the ontological concepts characterized by the first sort of topic-neutrality are not excluded 
from formal ontology by endorsing the second one; for, plausibly, concepts which are topic-neutral 
according to the first are topic-neutral according to the second as well (but not vice versa). 
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are very far from exhausting what belongs to ontological form. The second concept, too, 
may at least provide something of an informal guide to tracking down formal ontological 
notions though the ‘topics’ or ‘subject-matters’ of the different sciences.12 
 
 
2.3 Characterizing formal ontological relations 
 
If the subject-matter of formal ontology, then, is not simply constituted by the topic-
neutral (in any sense) ontological notions, we will have to look elsewhere for a 
characterization. In this section, I will concentrate on formal or formal ontological 
relations and their characteristic features. Such relations are a crucial part of ontological 
form; arguably, together with categories at least, they exhaust it. 
 
Although formal or formal ontological relations have indeed been frequently 
characterized as topic- or domain-neutral (see e.g. Mulligan and Smith 1986: 118, Varzi 
2010: 6), other ideas have been involved as well. I will look into three notions closely 
associated with formal ontological relations. The idea of formal ontological relations 
characterized in terms of these will fully accommodate ‘categorial relations’ as well. 
 
2.31 Informal characterizations 
 
The terms ‘formal relation’ and ‘formal ontological relation’ are used rather ‘informally’. 
No extended systematic treatment of this type of relation, that I am aware of, exists; what 
one mostly finds are lists and accounts of such relations in the context of a particular 
ontological system (e.g. B. Smith 2005, Sect. 19; Lowe 2006, Chap. 3), or inventories of 
candidate ones (Simons 2010, 2012). Yet the idea that there are ‘special’ relations that 
ontology must take into account is much more common than the terms ‘formal’ or ‘formal 
ontological relation’. Universal realism, as is commonly recognized, must give an account 
of ‘exemplification’ or ‘instantiation’, and one that respects the unusual features of this 
relation (see e.g. Vallicella 2000 for an overview of these issues); trope theory, another 
mainstay of modern ontology, must similarly give an analysis of the crucial relations of 
                                                          
12
 The ‘plausible self-applicability’ of ‘formal ontological relations’ discussed below (2.32) can also be 
taken to be a sign of something that is at least akin to topic-neutrality. 
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resemblance and ‘compresence’ (see e.g. Maurin 2002, Sects. 5.3, 6.3, 6.4). It is likely 
that every adequate ontology or system of categories will be required to give in such a 
way, not simply a list of ‘what there is’, but also a list and an account of the formal 
ontological relations between entities — an account of ‘how beings are’, as Lowe puts it 
(2006: 48). Indeed, in the next chapter I will explore the idea that ontological categories 
could be somehow defined in terms of such relations. 
 
Can one give a general, ‘neutral’ characterization of formal ontological relations, not tied 
to any particular ontology? Before any real explication is attempted (in the next three 
sections), we may point at a general (extending farther than merely to formal ontological 
relations) intuitive difference there seems to obtain between certain relations, or, in 
general, predicates, concepts etc. Identity, part-of and object are intuitively ’empty’, 
’schematic’ and ’contentless’ notions, while love, parent-of and dog are not so, but seem 
to have ‘qualitative content’, in a way in which the previous three do not. This difference 
could, not unfittingly, indeed be called one between ‘formal’ and ‘material’ notions. 
Kevin Mulligan (1998) has talked of a similarly intuitive difference between ‘thin’ and 
‘thick’ concepts.13 One might think that such intuitively ‘formal’ or ‘thin’ notions are 
simply the topic-neutral ones (the three examples I just gave certainly seem to be topic-
neutral, in either of the senses distinguished above). But according to Mulligan, at least, 
‘thinness’ does not coincide with topic-neutrality (he seems to consider only the first sort 
of topic-neutrality, though) (1998: 347–48). At any rate, ‘thinness’ and topic-neutrality 
seem to be conceptually independent. 
 
So what examples can we find of such relations? Mulligan (1998: 342) gives the 
following list: identity, resemblance, greater than/lesser than/same as, distance, 
dependence, entailment, justification, exemplification. He also gives the following as 
relations of which it is ‘hard to tell’ whether they are ‘thin’ or ‘thick’: occupation, 
location, parthood (ibid.: 341). Here we can ignore justification and entailment, for even 
if they are ‘thin’ or ‘formal’ relations, they are not ontological ones — they are not 
relations between entities in general, but only between propositions or other 
‘truthbearing’ entities. We may compare Mulligan’s list with some lists of formal 
                                                          
13
 One finds in Ryle (1960: 118) a somewhat similar distinction between ‘full-blooded’ and ‘meatless’ 
concepts. The latter are according to him the concern of the formal logician, and the only examples he 
gives are paradigm logical constants (‘not’ and ‘some’). 
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ontological relations given by other authors. Lowe gives the following: identity, 
instantiation, characterization, exemplification, constitution, composition, dependence 
(2006: 34); Barry Smith tentatively lists the following ‘formal ties’: identity, parthood, 
instantiation, inherence, exemplification, existential dependence, is-a-subkind-of, 
temporal precedence, participation (in an occurrent), is-an-agent-of (-an occurrent), 
realizes (a function) (2005: 168); the following relations, again, can be gleaned from 
Simons (2012: 134–37): exemplification, dependence, part-whole, occupation, 
determination, numerical difference. As can be seen, there is quite a bit of overlap. 
 
Let us look at some of these relations. Identity (or difference) is found in all four lists. If 
identity is a relation at all, it is certainly a ‘thin’, ‘formal’ one. Lowe even takes identity 
to be something of a paradigm of a formal ontological relation, a ‘model’ for the rest, 
because of its clear status as a ‘metaphysically necessary condition’ of entities (he also 
points to its ‘lack of content’ as a ‘reflection’ of its formality) (Lowe 2006: 48–49). Again, 
mereological (parthood, composition) and ‘predicative’ relations (exemplification, 
instantiation, characterization) are included in all (although Mulligan hesitates with 
parthood). So are dependence relations. Spatiotemporal (distance, occupation, location) 
and comparative relations (greater than, less than, same as, resemblance) occur more 
sporadically. One reason for the fact that resemblance is not found in Lowe’s and Smith’s 
lists is certainly that Lowe and Smith, unlike Mulligan and Simons, are both universal 
realists and thus have no obvious need for the relation in their ontologies (Simons perhaps 
does not include resemblance or similarity because he thinks it is a mere ‘auxiliary’, non-
ontological notion (see Simons 2012: 135)). Mulligan’s hesitation with counting 
parthood, occupation, and location as ‘thin’ seems to be due to the fact that these relations 
are not easily taken as internal, i.e. as supervening on or following from their relata. 
Internality is Mulligan’s preferred way to account for the ‘thinness’ of relations (I will 
consider internality in 2.33 below). 
 
Several so-called ‘formal relations’ are sometimes thought not be ‘relations’ at all, or to 
be at most something like ‘pseudo-relations’, not relations properly speaking. Peter 
Strawson, for example, spoke of the predicative connection (‘assertible link’), tellingly, 
as a ‘non-relational tie’ (Strawson 2002: 167). ‘Exemplification’ and the like predicative 
‘relations’ are often taken to consist in something like the application of a function to 
arguments and for that reason not to be proper ‘relations’ (see e.g. Long 1982). The classic 
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example of a ‘pseudo-relation’ is identity. Perhaps most famously, Wittgenstein said that 
‘[i]t is self-evident that identity is not a relation between objects’ (TLP 5.5301). We will 
later see more examples of, and also some reasons for, such ‘deflationism’ with respect 
to ‘formal relations’. 
 
It is also a peculiarity of several ‘formal relations’ that they seem to relate ‘formal 
relations’ themselves as well. Identity is the obvious example: after all, we can e.g. count 
‘formal relations’. Another, according to Mulligan, is dependence. As Mulligan says, 
‘[e]very internal relation involves dependence but dependence is itself an internal 
relation’ (as are, according to Mulligan, the rest of his ‘thin relations’) (1998: 345) — in 
other words, dependence will apply to itself as well. This brings us in fact to the first 
candidate criterion of ‘formal relations’ in ontology. 
 
2.32 Self-applicability and ‘regress-proneness’ 
 
There is a well-known fact about exemplification14. Exemplification is supposed to 
‘connect’ or ‘tie together’ a subject-entity and a property, or several entities and a relation; 
once it has done so, the entity will have the property or the several entities will stand in 
the relation, and the corresponding predications will be true; indeed, the entities and the 
properties and relations are supposed to be connected together and the predications are 
supposed to be true only if it has done so. But, to all appearances at least, exemplification 
is itself another relation in need of ‘connecting’ or ‘tying together’. A moment’s reflection 
will reveal that, unless one can find some reason to think that at some stage no more 
‘connecting’ is needed, it will go on ad infinitum. 
 
What does this fact tell us about exemplification? First, it seems to tell us that if 
exemplification cannot perform its explanatory role (of explaining why, or rather how, a 
thing has a property or some things stand in a relation) without being itself exemplified, 
it will be impossible for it to perform it; second, it shows us that it is in general not 
implausible for exemplification to apply to itself. Call the first feature of exemplification 
                                                          
14
 I will use the term ‘exemplification’ of the contingent ‘tie’ connecting universals and particulars which 
is discussed by the classics of analytic ontology, like David Armstrong (e.g. 1989, 1997) or Gustav 
Bergmann (see e.g. his 1967). This is also often called ‘instantiation’, but I reserve this term for a 
different, non-contingent connection discussed e.g. by E. J. Lowe. 
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the regress appears to reveal self-connection, and the second self-applicability. Both 
features make a relation regress-prone, one that tends to generate a regress, but only the 
first at most will guarantee that the ensuing regress is a vicious one. Self-connection is a 
stronger feature, and entails self-applicability: in order to connect itself to itself, a relation 
must apply to itself, but it need not, and usually does not, apply to itself as self-connecting. 
That is, it need not apply to itself in virtue of itself (or in virtue of the same sort of relation, 
or relation from the same ‘family’), as exemplification does. Indeed, if one takes there to 
be a relation of (relational) exemplification, that will be the only self-connecting relation 
one is likely to have any need for. 
 
Self-connection is in fact not the only type of explanatory (and thus vicious) self-
application, only the best known one. Another is involved in the resemblance regress 
argument attributed to Russell (or to Guido Küng) (Russell 1940: 346–47, Küng 1967: 
68–9, Campbell 1990: 34–7), in which a regress of resemblances of resemblance relations 
(as particular relational entities or tropes) is used to argue for universal realism (at least 
with respect to resemblance relations). The viciousness of the regress seems to arise from 
taking the ‘content’ of resemblance relations (their being resemblance relations) to be 
given ‘from the outside’ by their mutual resemblances, the ‘content’ of which is again 
given in the same way. This leads to the relations never receiving any determinate nature 
and thus to their being unable to perform their explanatory role (of explaining the 
resemblance of entities). Another example of explanatory self-application seems to be 
pointed out by Simons (2010: 206-7): if causing itself were caused (which is at least not 
immediately absurd, even if motivation for the idea may be hard to find), there would be 
an infinite regress of intermediary ‘causings’, so that the causal connection between the 
original cause and effect would never be achieved. Indeed, Simons uses this to argue that 
causation is a ‘formal tie’ (loc. cit.). 
 
As already said, not all self-applicable relations apply as somehow explaining their own 
‘operation’. Spatiotemporal relations, for example, could be taken to apply to themselves: 
e.g. a location relation could itself be located; a temporal precedence relation could 
temporally precede something (or at least it does not seem immediately absurd to think 
so). There is no doubt that such a view will lead to problems (Where precisely would a 
location relation be located? Would temporal precedence be between what precedes and 
what follows?). The point is, though, that among these problems are apparently not 
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included unachievable explanatory tasks, as in the two examples of self-applying relations 
from the previous paragraph. Unless location, for example, is taken as a connecting 
relation (perhaps it could be made to do the work of exemplification, for example), there 
seems to be no way to take it as somehow applying to itself in virtue of itself (at least, I 
can think of no other such explanatory role for it). A regress certainly seems to ensue — 
‘higher-order’ location relations will apparently be themselves located — but the location 
facts of different ‘orders’ will be independent from each other, at least in the sense that 
location facts lower in the hierarchy will not obtain in virtue of those higher up: for 
example, if location relation L1 is located (by L2) in l, this obtains just in virtue of 
whatever it is that connects L2 with L1 and l; the location of L2 (by a further location 
relation L3) does not enter into it. Other examples of conceivably self-applying relations 
include parthood (the parthood relation could be a part, e.g., if relations are parts of states 
of affairs and parthood ‘facts’ are themselves states of affairs) and dependence (this latter 
was already mentioned in the previous section and something more will be said about it 
in the next one). Resemblance, too, can on an alternative view be taken to be ‘harmlessly’ 
self-applying: resemblance tropes could be taken to resemble each other, but not so that 
they would receive their ‘nature’ from these resemblances; all resemblances could be 
taken to supervene on the prior ‘natures’ of the resembling items. There would still be a 
regress but it would apparently be a non-vicious one (see Campbell 1990: 37 for this view 
of resemblance).  
 
As the examples above show, formal ontological relations seem to be often prima facie 
plausibly self-applicable. Now, I say ‘prima facie plausibly’, because the ensuing 
regresses, at the very least (there are other reasons as well, as we have seen), certainly 
tend to provide a reason to in the end reject self-application. Yet formal ontological 
relations seem at first blush to be ontologically construable in such a way that they can 
be conceived to participate, as entities, in the types of ontological structure they 
themselves constitute. Thus it is at least not immediately absurd to ask e.g. about the 
spatiotemporal or causal status of formal ontological relations — including 
spatiotemporal or causal relations themselves. By contrast, such self-applicability does 
not seem to be at all plausible in the case of ‘material’ relations: to take motherhood to 
be a mother or a child or a collision to collide with something would of course be 
straightforwardly absurd. These relations are not ‘formal ties’ belonging, so to say, to the 
groundwork of reality. Simons talks of ‘metaphysical bedrock’; he says it is a sign that 
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we are close to this ‘bedrock’ when ‘the same questions keep arising about the basics as 
we use the basics to explain’ (Simons 2012: 138). Such questioning leads of course to 
regresses, even if not necessarily to vicious ones (loc. cit.). Simons’ point cannot be taken 
to be that these relations actually do generate regresses; he does not seem to think that the 
questions are really legitimate when asked about the ‘basics’. He thinks the relations 
should be understood as internal, which (for him) means they should not be considered 
to be entities of any kind (loc. cit.). A ‘basic’, ‘formal’ relation should, then, not be 
understood as something which can belong to its own range of application (see, on the 
other hand, Lowe 2006: 51; Lowe thinks that one can take ‘formal ontological relations’ 
to relate ‘formal ontological relations’ despite their being ‘non-entities’). Yet it remains 
true, that if we were to take relations like exemplification or resemblance to be entities, 
questions about their own exemplifications or resemblances would be (at least on certain 
ontological construals) legitimate, even obligatory (as, arguably, in the case of 
exemplification at least), and we would meet with infinite regresses. One could call this, 
alluding to Simons, the ‘bedrock effect’: when a relation tends to apply to itself, when the 
‘effect’ is manifested, it is (probably) a ‘basic’, formal ontological relation. 
 
The ‘self-applicability’ criterion certainly has its limits. For example, are ‘greater than’ 
or ‘less than’ plausibly ‘self-applying’? That is, can they be ontologically construed as 
entities that have a ‘magnitude’? I don’t think this question has a clear answer. What it 
means that a relation ‘can plausibly’ (at least at first blush) be applied to itself (or to a 
relation of the same sort) is also not very clear. Nevertheless, tendency to generate infinite 
regresses when taken with ontological seriousness is, as is well known, an important 
feature of ‘predicative’ relations and, as is perhaps less well known, of several other sorts 
of relations as well, and this feature would seem to be due to the ‘basicness’ and ‘bedrock’ 
nature of the relations. But whether this feature is in any way constitutive of the supposed 
‘formality’ of ‘formal relations’ I take to be doubtful. 
 
‘Regress-proneness’ of relations motivates attempts to analyze them as internal or as 
lacking ontological status (we have seen that Simons does just this), so that no vicious 
regresses arise (e.g. Lowe 2006: 111, B. Smith 2005: 168). Internality and lack of 
ontological status seem to be often confused — and understandably so, for internal 
relations can easily be eliminated (see Mulligan 1998: 349–50), so that it may seem that 
lack of ontological status simply follows from internality — but I will treat of them 
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independently in what follows. Indeed, mere internality does not get rid of all regresses 
as such, only of vicious ones, as we will see. This is due to the fact pointed out in the last 
section: that internality involves dependence and dependence itself is a relation, even if 
an internal one. 
 
2.33 Internality 
 
The term ‘internal’ has been used of relations in more than one sense (for example, in his 
classic treatment of the ‘theory of internal relations’, A. C. Ewing (1934: 117–42) lists no 
fewer than ten different senses of ‘internal relation’). Here the term will be applied 
exclusively to those relations that supervene on or follow necessarily from the existence 
of their relata15. The opposite of ‘internal’ is, of course, ‘external’. Correspondingly, 
those relations are ‘external’ which do not obtain merely in virtue of the existence of their 
relata, but — from a truthmaking point of view which I adopt here  — require the 
existence of something additional to them. 
 
‘Formal’ relations are commonly taken to be internal (e.g. Lowe 2006: 46, 167, Simons 
2012: 137–38). They are also said to ‘come for free’ and not to ‘add anything to being’ 
(Smith & Grenon 2004: 287). Indeed these two views usually go together. Thus Simons 
says that in fact ‘[i]nternal relations are badly named’, because ‘there are no such things’ 
(2012: 138)16. But strictly speaking, internality as such simply means that once you have 
the relata, you have the relation obtaining between them. The relation can very well still 
be an entity of its own — only, it will be such that its relata are (together) dependent on 
it and it is itself dependent on its relata (as in Mulligan 1998). Now, of course, what reason 
one might have for taking there to be such supervenient, dependent relational entities is a 
different question (one possible reason is given below). 
                                                          
15
 One of the first clear formulations of this sense of ‘internal relation’ is to be found in Moore 1919. 
More recent examples are to be found in e.g. Armstrong (1997: 87) and Campbell (1990: 110–13). The 
present sense of ‘internal relation’ could also be taken to be a restriction of a more general sense. Those 
relations are also often called ‘internal’ which supervene on the (intrinsic) properties, both essential and 
accidental, of entities (see e.g. Armstrong 1978: 85, Lewis 1986: 62). The ‘internal relations’, in the sense 
I have in mind, would then be those relations which supervene on the essential (intrinsic) properties of 
their relata (I take it here, in effect, that there are no non-existent entities). 
16
 It seems that a ‘no addition to being’ claim could also be interpreted, not as a claim to the effect that 
something does not exist, but rather as a claim that something is what David Armstrong calls an 
‘ontological free lunch’ (e.g. 1997: 12–13). If a relation is taken as such a ’free lunch’, then it can be said 
to exist, but not as something ‘extra’, not as a distinct entity. 
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The concept of dependence or of ontological dependence calls for a short introduction, 
particularly as it figures repeatedly in this work. I will take ontological dependence to be 
a relation between entities; thus, I will not e.g. take truths to ‘depend’ (in the relevant 
sense) on their truthmakers or on other truths. The basic, minimal notion of ontological 
(existential) dependence can nonetheless be glossed with some sort of necessitation: x 
depends on y if and only if x necessitates y — i.e. if and only if given that x exists, y must 
also exist. Depending on the type of dependence, what replaces ‘y’ here can refer 
specifically to a particular entity (specific or rigid dependence) or just generically to an 
entity of some specified type (generic dependence). Thus e.g. a (non-empty) set, because 
of its extensional identity conditions, rigidly depends on its members17; a so-called 
Aristotelian universal, on the other hand, depends only generically on what exemplifies 
it: it must have some exemplifier or other (of a certain sort), but which individual entity 
or entities exemplify it is not determined. Dependence can also be mutual, or it can go in 
just one direction (‘one-way’ dependence). There are many other distinctions to be drawn 
between kinds of dependence, but these will be enough for our purposes at the moment 
(see Correia 2008, Tahko and Lowe 2015.) 
 
Let us reformulate the characterizations given earlier of internal relations so as to make 
the connection with ontological dependence stand out clearer. Relation R is internal to x 
and y if and only if the existence of x and y (together) necessitates the obtaining of the 
relation R between them18. It is to be noted that what is necessitated here is ‘obtaining’, 
not existence — at least not explicitly. Thus it may seem that one cannot actually have 
here a case of ontological dependence. But, in fact, one can take the obtaining of R 
between x and y to be explained by or grounded in, or take the corresponding truth to be 
made true by, the existence of an entity. Mulligan in his (1998), for example, takes that 
entity to be in each case a relational trope — i.e. a particular, non-repeatable relational 
entity. In such a case one will then have an ontological dependence between x and y 
                                                          
17
 Unless, of course, the members of a set can be nonexistent, and one can make sense of nonexistent 
entities. Even then there would still be dependence, only it would not be existential. The hyperintensional 
concept of essence I briefly described in the Introduction can be used to define an existentially neutral 
concept of dependence (see K. Fine 1995b). 
18
 Here internality is formulated as relative to something, but usually one just calls relations internal 
simpliciter. What one then means, in effect, is that the relation is internal to whatever it is true of. Most 
examples at least of internal relations are indeed always internal. The relations I will discuss are also 
dyadic; I will ignore relations of higher adicity. But what I say can easily be generalized, I suppose, to 
cover such relations as well. 
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together and the truthmaker. On the other hand, we can also see here again why it is so 
easy to slip to some sort of reductivism or eliminitavism with respect to internal relations. 
For if the existence of x and y directly necessitates the obtaining of the relation R between 
them, why take there to be such a mediating relational entity? If one takes truthmaking 
itself to be necessitation, one has indeed probably little reason to believe in internal 
relational entities. But it is in fact controversial whether truthmaking is necessitation or 
something stronger (see e.g. MacBride 2014). Now, if one takes truthmaking to be, for 
example, an explanatory in virtue of –relation (as e.g. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra does 
in 2002: 32–35), then the internally related entities x and y perhaps do not themselves 
make true the relational predication (even if they necessitate it), because they are not 
themselves relevant enough to it; thus truthmaking may in fact require a relational entity 
even in cases of internal relational predication (cf. Rodriguez-Pereyra: even if Socrates is 
essentially human, ‘what the proposition that Socrates is human seems to be true in virtue 
of is that Socrates is human, not just Socrates himself’ (2006: 192); see also 3.111 below).  
 
Internal relations seem to be an antidote to vicious regresses because, as already pointed 
out, plausibly, only those regresses are vicious which arise as a result of an attempt to 
ground or explain something, and the obtaining of internal relations (or the ‘connection’ 
of an internal relational entity to its subjects) need not be grounded in anything additional 
to the related entities themselves; thus the exemplification regress, for example, can be 
blocked by making exemplification into a trope internally connected by ontological 
dependence to the entities it ‘connects’ (the property or relation and its subject(s))19. On 
the other hand, if dependence relations themselves are taken to be entities along with the 
rest of internal relations, then regresses in general are not blocked: the exemplification 
trope and its relata, for example, will necessitate the existence of a dependence trope 
between them, and this along with its relata another one, and so on. We certainly have 
here a reason not to take internal relations, or at least not all of them, to be entities, because 
such a regress of relational entities is at the very least ‘uneconomical’, even if it does not 
seem to be vicious20. 
                                                          
19
 A solution like this to the exemplification regress is proposed by Luc Schneider (2013: 427–31), and 
Anna-Sofia Maurin (2012: 802–3), for example. One also can, of course, take the exemplified property or 
relation itself to be such a trope instead. 
20
 That infinite regresses in which each stage follows from the previous one are not vicious seems at least 
to be the common opinion. For example, the truth regress, which is of this sort, is usually thought to be 
benign (e.g. in Armstrong 1997: 119). 
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Is internality a universal characteristic of formal ontological relations? It would not seem 
to be, although many candidate formal ontological relations are indeed plausibly internal 
(e.g. identity, dependence, and, in certain cases, resemblance). For not every ‘formal 
ontological’ relation is plausibly internal. An example of a clearly ‘formal’, but plausibly 
‘external’ relation is exemplification (even if it is not ‘purely’ external, see below). 
Moreover, not every internal (ontological) relation is plausibly ‘formal ontological’. For 
example, color-similarity (between e.g. color tropes, or entities that have their color 
essentially), while it may have a ‘formal’ ‘core’, is at least partially ‘material’. 
 
There is another important connection between ontological dependence and certain sorts 
of internal relations that must be pointed out here. Even if we don’t take internal relations 
to be ontologically dependent relational entities (or grounded in such), ontological 
dependence is still in many cases intimately involved in the internality of a relation. There 
seem to be many relations the obtaining of which is in each case necessitated not merely 
by the existence of both of the related entities together, but already by the existence of 
one or the other on its own. This means, in effect, that there is necessitation, i.e. 
ontological dependence, between the relata themselves, for the relation cannot obtain if 
both of its relata do not exist. Ontological dependence (the rigid variety) is itself an 
example of such a relation, but there seem to be other examples as well. The relation of 
‘inherence’ or ‘characterization’ between a ‘non-transferable’ trope and its subject, for 
example, is necessitated by the existence of the trope and the subject together, but the 
existence of the subject, moreover, is necessitated by the existence of the trope (see Lowe 
2006: 37); thus ‘characterization’ is associated with a relation of rigid ‘one-way’ 
dependence, between the trope and its subject, in that order.  
 
Ingvar Johansson has called those internal relations that are associated in such a way with 
rigid mutual dependence ‘strongly internal’ (Johansson 2014: 233; see also Clementz 
2014)21. He leaves open the possibility that one could also count in relations associated 
                                                          
21
 In an earlier work, Johansson calls these same relations simply ‘internal’, other internal relations (in the 
usual terminology) being referred to as ‘grounded relations’ (Johansson 1989, Chapter 8). Karen Bennett, 
too, discusses a very similar sounding variant of the internality of relations which she calls 
‘superinternality’: ‘A superinternal relation is one such that the intrinsic nature of only one of the relata 
— or, better, one side of the relation — guarantees not only that the relation holds, but also that the other 
relatum(a) exists and has the intrinsic nature it does’ (Bennett 2011: 32). 
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with mere ‘one-way’ dependence (2014: 235); on the other hand, the dependence he talks 
of is always rigid. It is easy to understand why this is so: no obtaining of a relation 
between the particular entities x and y can be necessitated on the basis of generic 
dependence alone, for, although x may generically depend on a type (by requiring 
something of that type) of which y is a token and vice versa, there will not, it seems, 
thereby be any necessary connection in which x and y themselves are together involved. 
Thus, although the thing alone may indeed necessitate the obtaining of a relation between 
itself and something else on which it generically depends (i.e. it is necessary that, if x 
exists, there is a y such that xRy), this sort of necessitation will not make the relation 
‘internal’, at least not in the sense in which the term has been used here and in which it is 
generally used.  
 
In a sense, though, such relations are not purely ‘external’ either, for there is indeed 
necessitation between relata and relation, even if it is not necessitation of any particular 
relational connection between specific entities. The exemplification connection 
mentioned above, for example, is often taken to be governed by what is in effect mutual 
generic dependence (‘Principle of Instantiation’; see e.g., Armstrong 1978: 9): particulars 
must exemplify some universal or other, and universals must be exemplified by at least 
some particulars. Yet the particular combinations of universals and particulars are not 
thereby fixed. What is fixed is merely, so to say, the combinatorial ‘space’ in which 
particulars and universals must be ‘located’: a particular must be ‘somewhere’ in the 
‘space’ of combinatorial possibilities constituted by the universals, and a universal, 
similarly, ‘somewhere’ in the ‘space’ constituted by the particulars (Wittgenstein would 
seem to be describing ‘generic dependence’ through such a metaphor in a passage from 
the Tractatus: ‘A speck in the visual field, though it need not be red, must have some 
colour: it is, so to speak, surrounded by colour-space’ (2.0131; Pears-McGuinness 
translation)). Although a relation like exemplification behaves in an importantly different 
way from a relation like characterization, so that the latter but not the former can be 
considered fully ‘internal’ in the sense of ‘necessitated by the existence of its relata’, what 
is common to both is that they involve ontological dependence. 
 
Relations associated with or involving dependence, whether rigid or merely generic, are, 
I believe, relevant to the issue of fundamental ontological categories. In the next chapter, 
I will in fact look at how ontological categories could even be defined or ‘captured’ in 
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terms of such relations. But it may seem that to attempt to understand fundamental 
ontological categories through basic ontological relations is misconceived. For relations 
like characterization and exemplification would seem to be themselves simply definable 
in terms of categories and dependence relations (and, in the case of a ‘generic’ relation 
like exemplification, perhaps an additional external ‘connection’ relation to actually form 
specific connections; see the end of 2.34 below). Dependence relations (and the 
‘connection’ relation) as such do not seem to be sufficient for characterizing categories. 
Similarly, it seems to be the view of Johansson that rigid (mutual) dependence simply is 
the ‘strongly internal’ relation: he defines the ‘strong internality’ of a relation as the 
mutual rigid dependence of its relata (2014: 233) (he seems to be prepared to give up 
mutuality here, though, as already indicated). In his (1989) Johansson refers approvingly 
to Ewing’s (1934) definition of a corresponding notion of ‘internal relation’, which 
includes a reference to a relation R in addition to necessitation, but goes on to suggest that 
the additional ‘relational term’ be eliminated from it (1989: 117). 
 
Lowe, too, recognizes the possible redundancy involved in having both relations like 
characterization and instantiation, and dependence relations in one’s ontological system, 
although he does not seem to recognize the possibility of defining the first sort of relations 
in terms of dependence relations and the categories (2006: 37). He does not think, though, 
that either sort of relation should be eliminated or analyzed as ‘derivative’, although he 
does give a certain priority to characterization and instantiation. Lowe believes that 
dependence relations are always ‘constituted’ by certain other formal ontological 
relations obtaining between the entities — for example, the characterization relation 
mentioned earlier ‘constitutes’ the rigid dependence of the trope or ‘mode’ on the 
substance it characterizes (2006: 37). There are no ‘brute’ dependencies (loc. cit.). Lowe 
seems to think, then, that dependence connections are explained in terms of other relations 
— this is what the rather odd use of the formal ontological relation of ‘constitution’ here 
seems to mean. In other words, one must ask: what does the ontological dependence of a 
mode on a substance (for example) consist in? Lowe’s answer seems to be that it consists 
in the mode’s characterizing the substance. 
 
But why does Lowe not ground the dependence directly on the related entities themselves, 
and say that it consists in the mode’s being the very mode it is and the substance’s being 
that very substance? After all, dependencies are necessitated by the existence of the 
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dependent entities. It seems to me that Lowe sees expressed in the distinction between 
(what Johansson calls) ‘weakly’ and ‘strongly internal’ relations a difference that is 
deeper than simply the difference in what necessitates what (i.e. in whether the relation 
is necessitated by either of the relata on its own, or only by the relata together). And it is 
only ’weakly internal’ relations, Lowe seems to think, that are truly nothing ‘over and 
above’ the related entities. 
 
Francois Clementz (2014) says something similar about the two sorts of internal relation. 
He characterizes the distinction between ‘weakly’ and ‘strongly internal’ relations — in 
Clementz’s words ‘grounded essential’ and ‘essential but ungrounded’ or ‘directly 
constitutive’ relations, respectively (ibid.: 209) — in terms of what has ontological 
priority in the relational situation, the relata or the relation (ibid.: 211). According to 
Clementz, when there is a ‘directly constitutive’ relation obtaining between some entities, 
the relation itself (or possibly the relational complex or fact), in effect, helps to constitute 
the identity of its relata (and it is for this reason that the relata necessitate both the relation 
and each other) (ibid.: 211, 220). Now, although Lowe would probably have no truck 
with the idea that a relation, or even a relational complex, is ontologically prior to its 
relata, neither is he, it seems, ready to say that when there is a relation associated with 
ontological dependence obtaining between some entities, the relation is simply 
supervenient or ‘grounded’ on its relata (see Lowe 2006: 46–47). Despite his view that 
formal ontological relations are not ‘entities’, Lowe hesitates to say that characterization 
and instantiation are ‘nothing in themselves’ (as is the case, he supposes, with a relation 
like being taller than); for instantiation and characterization mark, as he says, ‘real 
connections’ between entities; unlike the relata of the taller than –relation, the relata of 
instantiation and characterization are ‘made for each other’ and thus one cannot, he thinks, 
‘simply’ say that these relations are ‘no addition of being’ (loc. cit.). What, then, is 
Lowe’s view on the status of relations like characterization and instantiation? 
Unfortunately, he does not elaborate. Nevertheless, perhaps one way to interpret these 
remarks is as pointing to a view on which ontological dependencies are to be explained 
by relations that are somehow ‘part of the natures’ of the related entities. This would 
perhaps constitute a compromise of sorts between ‘grounded essentiality’ and 
‘ungrounded essentiality’ of relations. I will return to this in the next chapter. 
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2.34 Lack of ontological status 
 
We come now to the final feature we will discuss that has been thought to characterize 
‘formal ontological’ relations. It grows largely out of the previous one, for, from the 
truthmaking point of view here adopted, elimination of entities is acceptable only when 
their truthmaking tasks can be taken over by others. With internal relations this is of 
course easily done (at least given certain assumptions about truthmaking). Just by the 
definition of ‘internal relation’, the relata x and y themselves will together make true (or 
necessitate, at any rate) every internal relational truth about them. The case of external 
relations is, on the other hand, at least much less straightforward. 
 
That ‘formal ontological’ relations lack an ontological status, that they are not themselves 
entities of any kind, is the view of e.g. Simons (2010: 206-7, 2012: 137–38), Lowe (2006: 
46–47, 206), and B. Smith (2005: 168). These authors motivate such a view with, e.g., 
the need to avoid regresses (Simons 2010: 206-7; B. Smith 2005: 168), with the adequacy 
of the relevant relata as truthmakers (Simons 2012: 138; see also Lowe 2006: 205–7), or 
even with formal ontological relations’ being ‘metaphysically necessary conditions’ 
which thus, supposedly, cannot themselves be part of the world (Lowe 2006: 49).  
 
(It should perhaps be emphasized here that there is nothing wrong with the sort of 
reduction of relations in question here. It is of course well-known that one cannot in 
general reduce polyadic to monadic logic. But leaving out some relations from one’s 
ontology does not require not admitting predicates corresponding to those relations in, so 
to say, one’s ‘ideology’. It is not relational talk that is being reduced — not polyadic 
predicates —, but only relations as entities. Polyadic logic is still the logic of formal 
ontological relational talk, never mind how predications of formal ontological relations 
are made true.) 
 
Is it necessary to deprive formal ontological relations of ontological status in order to 
avoid regresses? As argued in the previous section, to avoid vicious regresses, it seems 
one need only ‘anchor’ the relations in their relata by ontological dependence (they will 
then perhaps do no work, however, and thus might as well be eliminated). But if one 
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wishes to avoid even ‘benign’, non-explanatory regresses, it seems one must also get rid 
of distinct entities corresponding to these relations.  
 
What concerns the adequacy of the relata of formal ontological relations as truthmakers 
for formal relational truths, this seems of course to depend on how one understands 
truthmaking (as pointed out in the last section), as well as on whether formal ontological 
relations are all internal. Now, one can of course try to dispense with all ‘external’ formal 
relations by adopting an appropriate sort of ontology (as Lowe, for example, does); but if 
one wants to give an at least reasonably general and neutral account of ontological form, 
as I am trying to do here, one needs a stronger reason for excluding ‘external’, non-
supervenient relations from it than merely the fact that there are indeed possible 
ontologies in which all formal ontological relations are supervenient. But are there any 
good ‘metaontological’ reasons why e.g. Armstrong’s state of affairs ontology, with its 
‘external’ exemplification tie, should be taken off the table? 
 
It may appear, though, that one could take there to be, in certain cases, a truthmaker for 
an external relational truth that is indeed in some sense not ‘over and above’ the related 
entities themselves. Armstrong — who at least sometimes took there to be a non-
supervenient exemplification connection between particulars and universals — has 
proposed that the ‘fundamental nexus’ of exemplification ‘is nothing but the bringing 
together of particulars and universals in states of affairs’ (Armstrong 1989: 109–10). Such 
‘bringing together’ seems to be an example of what Armstrong calls ‘nonmereological 
composition’ (ibid.: 93, 1997: 118); in particular, the ‘state of affairs’ is a 
‘nonmereological’ whole because its existence does not supervene on the mere existence 
of its parts (universals and particulars). What, then, does ground the ‘composition’ or 
‘bringing together’ of the parts of a ’state of affairs’ and thus the latter’s existence? 
Nothing, it seems, if not the existence of the state of affairs itself, for not only does the 
state of affairs exist if and only if its parts are ‘brought together’ or connected by 
exemplification, but to talk about the existence of a state of affairs and the connection 
between its parts is to talk ‘about the same thing’ (1989: 110). State of affairs talk is also 
‘more perspicuous’ (loc. cit.), so that it seems all we really have here is the existence of 
the state of affairs (elsewhere Armstrong explicitly says that ‘states of affairs come first’, 
talk of exemplification being just ‘convenient’ (1997: 118)). 
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The crucial ‘nonmereological’ feature of states of affairs is found in their existence-
conditions. ‘Mereological’ wholes or ‘sums’ are taken by Armstrong to exist ‘universally’ 
— i.e. every set of entities is taken to compose a mereological whole or sum. On the other 
hand, it is clear that not every set of entities can be taken to form a state of affairs. Some 
entities cannot form a state of affairs to begin with, e.g. two particulars; other entities are 
capable of composing a state of affairs, but do not actually do so. But Armstrong, in effect, 
takes states of affairs to differ from mereological sums in another way as well: in their 
identity-conditions (see e.g. Armstrong 1997: 121–22). For example, from an ordinary 
asymmetrical relation and two particulars, we can form two different states of affairs, e.g. 
the state of affairs that a is to the left of b, or that b is to the left of a; in other words, it 
seems that what the constituents of a state of affairs are is not sufficient to determine 
which state of affairs it is. This is not the case with mereological wholes (at least on the 
way Armstrong understands them, that is); their identity-conditions are extensional. 
 
But can we really account both (1) for the difference between some entities combining 
into a state of affairs and their not so combining, and (2) for the difference between states 
of affairs with the same constituents but different ‘modes of combination’, without 
invoking any entities additional to what is combined (as Armstrong seems to think)? Now, 
in fact, it is not inevitable that we will need to address (2). It may be that, in the final 
analysis, all external, non-symmetrical relations are essentially restricted to certain types 
of terms in a certain order, as is the case with exemplification: the universal F and the 
particular a, for example, can combine (be related by exemplification) in only one way; 
thus the identity of a monadic state of affairs can be taken to be determined by its 
constituents alone. Russell once called ‘complexes’ like the monadic state of affairs, in 
which the order of the constituents cannot be changed without producing something 
impossible, heterogeneous, and ‘complexes’ in which the order can be changed (like the 
‘complex’ formed by a and b when one is to the left of the other) homogeneous, and 
proposed, in effect, to analyze all homogeneous complexes into heterogeneous ones 
(Russell 1992: 123, 88). If something like this can be done, we need not worry about 
different ‘modes of combination’ (see MacBride 2012 for an overview of Herbert 
Hochberg’s attempts to revive Russell’s idea). 
 
On the other hand, (1) is inescapable, and here there seems to be a serious problem, 
especially if one adheres to the truthmaker principle (as Armstrong does, and as we do 
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here). Particulars and universals, it is supposed, are not ‘as such’, ‘internally’ or by their 
natures, combined into definite states of affairs. It is true that it could perhaps be supposed 
that universals and particulars can, by their nature, only form one type of complexes to 
begin with, those in which particulars and a universal are related by exemplification 
(states of affairs); moreover, if there can be no variation in order among the constituents, 
to determine what the constituents are will certainly be sufficient for determining what 
their characteristic complex is. Nevertheless, it will not determine that it is: what can be 
taken to follow from the existence of the constituents is at most a possible state of affairs. 
Thus an actual state of affairs cannot be just its constituents. It is, instead, the particular(s) 
and the universal as ‘brought together’. But what does this mean? What does ‘being 
brought together’ consist in? Now, perhaps one could simply take it to be a brute fact with 
no further analysis (this sort of move is made, for example, in Markosian 1998, in the 
context of discussing ‘nonuniversalist’ mereological composition): that a and F are 
‘brought together’ is a primitive, unexplainable matter. But if one takes this road, it seems 
that the truthmaker principle will go by the board. For there will be truths — namely, ones 
about the composition of states of affairs — that have no truthmakers: no ‘bringer-
together’ exists. If one, on the other hand, takes states of affairs to be entities distinct from 
and additional to their constituents, then one abandons the idea that states of affairs are 
nothing ‘over and above’ particulars and universals. 
 
It seems, then, that formal ontological relations cannot always be taken to lack ontological 
status. Perhaps ontological form should indeed ideally constitute merely the ‘ideology’ 
of the theory of categories, and thus have no ontological commitments of its own (one 
could, for example, appeal to the need to avoid infinite regresses). But the truthmaking 
approach puts considerable restrictions on what can be taken to be ‘mere’ ‘ideology’ and 
I hesitate to say that we would never need to enrich our ‘ontology’ with additional 
truthmakers for formal ontological connections. However, I believe one can make do with 
a single kind of ‘neutral’ tie or ‘connector’ for all external formal ontological connections. 
For the way entities can be connected is, I believe, always given by their natures; for 
every collection of entities, there is at most one way they could be contingently or 
‘externally’22 connected: in virtue of their ‘categorial’ natures, universals and particulars, 
                                                          
22
 ‘Contingently’ or ‘externally’, because it is true that, if there are sets and mereological sums, there is 
for every collection of entities at least these two different ways of being ‘combined’; but it is plausible 
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for example, can only combine into states of affairs. Now, if this is the case, then the only 
difference that needs to be grounded is that between constituents actually combining into 
a complex and their not so combining. And to this one suitable23 kind of entity is enough; 
one does not need an array of different relational entities. On the other hand, all truly 
‘internal’ relations can, I take it, happily be taken not to be distinct entities, and can thus 
be excluded from ‘ontology’, and taken as ‘ideology’ — as purely a matter of ‘how beings 
are’, in Lowe’s words.  
 
*** 
 
It seems we will have to conclude on the basis of the preceding discussion that no 
sufficiently clear and unitary concept of a ‘formal’ or ‘formal ontological relation’ is to 
be found in the writings of the ontologists who use these terms. This is not to say, 
however, that the idea of ‘ontological form’ would be worthless. There are several 
important and, I believe, connected issues that it brings together. Paradigm instances of 
‘ontological form’ are relations like identity and exemplification. Even if it is difficult to 
find a criterion that would distinguish such relations from the ‘material’ ones, 
paradigmatic cases like identity and exemplification certainly do have in common several 
interesting and important features. They are ubiquitous, if not always topic-neutral; 
connected with this, there is at least a temptation to take them as ‘self-applying’, which 
is again connected with what is probably the most well-known feature of exemplification, 
tendency to generate an infinite regress; they are also essential to their relata (at least 
‘generically’, as exemplification plausibly is), a feature which supports the idea that they 
are not distinct items in the ontology (although this idea is problematic in the case of 
‘generic’ essentiality, at least if we adopt a truthmaking approach to ontological 
commitment); again, these features are connected with the role ontologists are ready to 
give these relations as determining the fundamental ‘how they are’ of entities (Lowe 
2006: 48), the ‘syntax’ of being as opposed to its ‘vocabulary’ (see Clementz 2014: 220), 
or the fundamental ‘ideology’ as opposed to ‘ontology’ (in the Quinean sense, that is). I 
think we can also conclude, then, that formal ontologists are at least gesturing at 
                                                          
that the relevant sets or mereological sums exist necessarily, given merely the existence of their 
constituents. 
23
 For what would be suitable, see e.g. Schneider 2013 and Maurin 2012. 
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something important with their talk of ‘formal’ aspects of entities or of ‘formal 
ontological relations’. 
 
 
3. Categories and formal ontological relations 
 
In this chapter my objective is to explore how ontological form, as consisting of formal 
ontological relations, bears on the drawing of categorial distinctions. I will try to show 
that ontological categories could be characterized through formal ontological relations or 
‘structures’. 
 
3.1 The Ontological Square and Two Types of Category System  
 
In this section, I will look at Aristotle’s so-called Ontological Square (OS) as an example 
of a category system in which something like formal ontological relations are given a 
central role. I will present two interpretations of the OS. In both of them, the relations are 
taken to ‘define’ or ‘generate’ at least some of the categories in OS, but in different ways. 
Category systems as instanced by Aristotle’s OS according to the second interpretation 
(given in 3.112) will then be my primary concern in the rest of the chapter. I will briefly 
discuss Lowe’s version of OS as an example of this sort of category system in 3.12., 
before trying to answer some objections to the general idea involved in it of ‘relational 
accounts’ of category distinctions in 3.2. 
 
3.11 Aristotle’s Ontological Square 
 
The idea that category distinctions can somehow be made by means of a relation or ‘tie’ 
in which entities stand can apparently be traced back to Aristotle. In the second chapter 
of the Categories (= Cat.) (1a20), Aristotle appears to use two relations, is said of (or 
predication) and is present in (inherence), to distinguish between four types of things. 
The category system that results has been called the Ontological Square (OS) by Ignacio 
Angelelli (1967): the four categories it consists of can be arranged into the corners of a 
square, with the relational connections between the categories as the sides (see the figure 
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in Angelelli 1967: 12). Aristotle’s OS has recently been picked up and modified by Lowe 
(2006), who also emphasizes the importance of the relational connections within it.24 
 
Despite appearances, is said of or predication is not here a relation involving linguistic 
items. What is supposed to be predicated is man (the species or kind), not ‘man’ (the word 
or name) (see Ackrill 2002: 75). Is said of or predication is, then, supposed to be the 
relation that obtains between a kind and what is of that kind (note though that, for 
Aristotle, not only the individuals but the subkinds as well are instances of the species 
and genera in a hierarchy of kinds, see Cat. 3a37–3b5.) Is present in or inherence, again, 
seems to be explained by Aristotle in terms of some sort of ontological dependence. What 
is present in something is ‘incapable of existence apart from’ it (Cat. 1a22–23). It is not 
clear how precisely the dependence of what is present in should be understood. Dependent 
status does not seem to be a peculiarity of what is ‘present in’ for Aristotle; what is ‘said 
of’ seems to be dependent as well (see Cat. 2b5–6). 
 
To be precise, rather than using the is said of and present in –relations as polyadic 
properties or predicates to distinguish between the four types of entity25, Aristotle uses 
instead something like relational properties26, and only one per relation (the converses 
are never alluded to): is said of a subject and is present in a subject. These then generate 
four categories in the following way (the order is that of Aristotle’s exposition in Cat., 
Chap. 2; this order will be used in what follows unless otherwise stated): 
 
 1. said of a subject, not present in a subject 
 2. not said of a subject, present in a subject 
 3. said of a subject, present in a subject 
 4. not said of a subject, not present in a subject 
 
                                                          
24
 Aristotle’s famous ten categories (introduced in Cat., Chap. 3) will be ignored here. All of them are 
subsumed by the OS, under substances and accidents. I make no apologies for using the term ‘category’ 
of the four types of entity distinguished in Cat., Chapter 2, but it must be borne in mind that this is not the 
word Aristotle uses of them. 
25
 Aristotle, as is well known, seems to lack the modern concept of a relation; the so-called category of 
‘relations’ is actually one of relatives (pros ti), of entities that are essentially ‘referred to’ other entities, 
like slave or equal (Cat., Chap. 7). 
26
 It should be noted that there is no basis for taking either the ‘relations’ or the ‘relational properties’ 
discussed here to be themselves entities for Aristotle. They are probably best taken as sui generis formal 
relations that are nothing ontologically in addition to the entities they ‘connect’. 
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The notion of ‘subject’ is never explained, but it is said that primary substances are the 
ultimate ‘subjects’ for everything else (Cat. 2a35). Primary substances themselves are 
those things that do not bear either of the relational properties — or that have their 
negations (type 4). Things of type 1 are called by Aristotle secondary substances (2a13–
18); we can also talk about universal substances (or substantial universals). Things of 
types 2 and 3 are not given a special designation by Aristotle in Categories, but tradition 
knows them as accidents: things of type 2 are particular or individual accidents, those of 
type 3 universal accidents (or accidental universals). 
 
Although primary substances are the ultimate ‘subjects’ in the OS, the general notion of 
‘subject’ does not seem to coincide with that of ‘primary substance’: for example, while 
the subject in which a universal accident is present in is a substance, what it is said of is 
apparently an accident27; although this accident (a particular one) is itself present in 
another subject, which is a primary substance — and so the predication connection of the 
universal accident does ultimately ‘lead’ to an ultimate ‘subject’ — it seems that a 
universal accident cannot be immediately connected through predication except to 
another accident (because the definition of an accident is not predicable of a substance 
(Cat. 2a27–34), i.e. an accidental universal never gives the kind of a substance). 
Inherence, by contrast, would seem to admit both universal (secondary) and particular 
(primary) substances as ‘subjects’ (thus there are two inherence connections emanating 
from a universal accident in Angelelli’s figure (1967: 12); Ackrill (2002: 74–75), though, 
thinks that universal accidents do not themselves inhere in anything, except perhaps 
derivatively). Nevertheless, primary substances are clearly supposed to have a privileged 
place in the OS. In particular, Aristotle says that ‘if [primary substances] did not exist, it 
would be impossible for anything else to exist.’ (2b5–6). What this text (at least the 
translation) seems to attribute to primary substances is some sort of existential priority or 
independence; although this is not said explicitly, one wonders what the point would be 
of only stating the dependence of other things on primary substance if primary substance 
again depended on them. In fact, though, it is not obvious that the independence attributed 
to primary substances in the passage is existential instead of some other kind of 
                                                          
27
 Whether this is actually so is not clear, see Angelelli 1967: 14; as Angelelli also notes, ‘the distinction 
[between universals and particulars among accidents] is required by the system’, yet it is not clearly made 
by Aristotle (Angelelli 1967: 15). I will at any rate assume that it is made. 
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ontological independence (see e.g. Corkum 2008: 72–76 for reasons against taking 
primary substances to be existentially independent; see also Koslicki 2013: 35–37). 
 
While it is not quite clear what Aristotle is actually trying to do in Chapter 2 of the 
Categories — is he offering something like definitions28, or are the two relations perhaps 
merely a convenient way to organize four independently given types of things by their 
characteristics? —  I will assume that he is trying to give more than a merely accidental 
characterization of the four types of things (or of three of them; see below) in terms of 
the two relations. But even if one understands the role of predication and inherence in 
Aristotle’s four-fold classification of entities in this way, much seems still to be left open 
for interpretation. How precisely are predication and inherence supposed to account for 
the categorial distinctions within the OS? What I will do next is look at two different ways 
of understanding the two relations and their role in Aristotle’s OS. The purpose of the 
discussion, however, will not be to arrive at the correct interpretation of the OS in 
Aristotle. Instead, I intend merely to explore the general idea of defining categories in 
terms of relations (in the context of the view of fundamental categories I adopted in the 
Introduction), using Aristotle’s OS just as material. Consequently, I will not be overly 
fussy about historical accuracy. 
 
 
3.111 ‘Hierarchy of being’ 
 
As already pointed out, Aristotle does not seem to give an equal status to the four kinds 
of entity; instead, he seems to give some sort of priority to primary substances. Thus an 
interpretation which clearly gives such a status to primary substances would seem to be 
preferable. There is also the occurrence of the notion of ‘subject’ as a constituent in the 
relational properties Aristotle uses to ‘generate’ the four types of entities. Is this notion 
nothing but an accidental feature of Aristotle’s formulation or something more? Here’s 
an interpretation of Aristotle’s OS on which the notion of ‘subject’ (or rather of a 
‘primary’ or ‘ultimate subject’) is crucial; it is also one in which the priority of primary 
                                                          
28
 Aristotle has his own notion of definition which, certainly, would not seem to apply here. Something is 
‘defined’, in the strict Aristotelian sense, only in terms of ‘genus’ and ‘difference’. Just as the ten 
categories are famously the ‘highest genera’, and thus can have no Aristotelian ‘definitions’, so the four 
types of entity in the OS probably cannot be taken to be ‘definable’ in this sense. 
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substances is clear: primary substances, as the ultimate ‘subjects’, are not themselves 
defined in terms of either ‘tie’ (Aristotle, of course, seems to define primary substances 
as those things that do not stand in either ‘tie’ to a subject and thus to define them, in a 
sense, in terms of the ‘ties’; but perhaps this could be taken merely to register the fact 
that, in a sense, neither ‘tie’ or relational property characterizes the category of primary 
substances); instead, all other entities (secondary substances, universal and particular 
accidents) essentially stand in one or both of the ties to a ‘subject’ which is either a 
primary substance or, so to say, a ‘secondary subject’ — a universal or an accident — 
which is again tied to another, ‘less secondary’ ‘subject’ (ultimately, everything of course 
has its ‘foundation’ in primary ‘subjects’ or substances); indeed, all entities except 
primary substances are, somehow, ‘beings’ only insofar as they are connected by the ‘ties’ 
ultimately to primary substances (this interpretation somewhat loosely follows that in 
Corkum 2008). It is a virtue of this interpretation that it is neutral as to whether primary 
substances could exist without universals and accidents. The sort of asymmetrical 
dependence it posits to obtain between primary substance and the rest of the categories is 
understood not in terms of existence; it is understood instead in terms of ‘ontological 
status’ (as Corkum does; see 2008: 76ff.) or in terms of ‘essence’ (as I will do below). 
 
How do the ‘ties’ work in ‘generating’ the categories on such an interpretation? One way 
of looking at it could be this: the ‘ties’ ‘operate on’ the antecedently given category of 
primary substances to ‘generate’ three derivative categories. This happens in stages in the 
case of universal accidents: first ‘present in’ combines with the ‘subject’ category of 
primary substances to give particular accidents; then ‘said of’ takes particular accidents 
(which are relatively ‘subjects’) and gives universal accidents; similarly, we might 
perhaps take there to be a whole hierarchy of secondary substance categories (Aristotle 
explicitly says that species is ‘more truly substance’ than genus (Cat. 2b22), thus 
suggesting that there are different grades of ‘secondariness’ among secondary substances) 
generated by something like recursive application of ‘said of’, beginning with primary 
substances. The idea here is that primary substance somehow ‘enters’, through 
predication and inherence, into the nature of the rest of the categories, but not vice versa, 
and that this is why universals etc. are ‘beings’ only insofar as they are tied to primary 
substance, but primary substances are ‘beings’ independently. If one were to give an 
account of just what e.g. a secondary substance (as such) is — its ‘real definition’ (see K. 
Fine 1994) — one would have to invoke primary substance and the predication relation. 
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One can compare this with how it would be natural to think of the essence of a natural 
number: the ‘real definition’ of number 2, for example, could be that it is the successor 
of 1; although number 1 is, of course, the number the successor of which is 2 — and this 
is, moreover, a necessary truth — this fact should perhaps not be taken to be ‘part of its 
essence’, to enter into the ‘real definition’ of number 1 (this example is inspired by K. 
Fine 1994: 14). Similarly, an infima species (a ‘first-order’ secondary substance) is, 
according to the present interpretation of the OS, by its ‘real definition’ something that is 
‘said of’ a primary substance — this is (part of) its essence qua or as an infima species; 
on the other hand, it is here thought not to be part of the essence or ‘real definition’ of a 
primary substance that it has something said of it — even if, as is plausible, there cannot 
be primary substances without secondary substances. 
 
Questions are, without a doubt, raised concerning just how ‘real definition’ is to be 
understood. For one, what exactly is it for a thing to ‘enter into’ — or to be ‘involved in’, 
or to be a ‘part’ of — the essence of another thing? If something is a ‘part’ of the essence 
of something else, is it also a ‘part’ of the thing itself? Are primary substances, for 
example, supposed to be parts of secondary substances? Also, what exactly is covered by 
the ‘real definition’ of a thing, if not everything that is necessary to a thing is supposed to 
belong to its ‘essence’? How is the line between ‘essential’ and merely necessary features 
of a thing to be drawn? To answer only the first group of questions here, no primary 
substance is, first of all, supposed here to be a ‘part’ of any secondary substance. What is 
rather meant in saying that x is ‘part of the essence’ of y is — as a terminology of 
‘involvement’ (see K. Fine 1995b) would better suggest — that what it is to be y is, among 
other things, to stand in some relation (to be specified) to x. Of course, the whole idea of 
non-modal essence and ‘real definition’ that I am invoking here can be questioned. To 
discuss this general issue here would, however, take us too far afield.  
 
It is important to note that when I talk about the ‘real definition’ of accidents or of 
universals, I do not mean the ‘real definition’ of specific accidents or universals; I am not 
talking about the essence of, e.g., the species man qua that very species, or of a particular 
color qua that very color, but of the essence of the species or the color insofar as it is of 
that category (a secondary substance, or a particular accident). The focus here is, after 
all, on the definition of categories. Michail Peramatzis (2011) presents an interpretation 
of the ontological priority of particular substances over ‘non-substances’ in Aristotle to 
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which the one I am suggesting here is rather similar (Peramatzis’s view is rather close to 
Corkum’s (2008), as he acknowledges (2011: 243, footnote 11)). On his view, ‘particular 
substance, in general, or any particular substance whatsoever makes non-substance 
attributes the general kinds of being that they are’ (2011: 246). Peramatzis admits that 
‘[t]his notion of ontological primacy is undeniably attenuated’ (loc. cit.). It is not said 
here that particular (i.e. primary) substances make the entities that depend on them the 
very entities that they are; the ontological priority in question obtains between substances 
and non-substances only insofar as these are of the ‘general type’ that they are. But surely, 
even if this is so, it does not make the priority any less real or important. Also, the 
dependence may in fact actually reach deeper at least in the case of particular accidents. 
As Peramatzis recognizes (ibid.: 236–37), the particular accidents of the OS could be 
interpreted as ‘tropes’ individuated in terms of their subject. If this is the right way to 
understand particular accidents, then it is not merely the ‘formal’, ‘categorial’ (my words, 
not Peramatzis’s) nature of these entities ‘in general’ that will be constituted through a 
relational connection with primary substances, but their individuality as well (it does not 
seem plausible, on the other hand, to take their ‘material’ nature to be constituted in such 
a way; Socrates may make the wisdom of Socrates that very instance of wisdom, but it 
will not make it wisdom; see however the following paragraph). 
 
There is another instance of ‘deeper’ dependence that one might take to obtain within the 
OS, although this seems to be more controversial. For are not primary substances and 
particular accidents (in part) made the very entities they are by having certain universals 
‘said of’ them? Isn’t Socrates, for example, a man by having the species man ‘said of’ 
him? Now, the present interpretation of the OS in fact cannot admit this, for it would 
make primary substances themselves essentially dependent. Instead, the ‘said of’ –
relation is associated only with the dependence of universals on particulars. On the other 
hand, if this is so, then the present view of the nature and role of the relations in Aristotle’s 
OS would perhaps be congenial to those who insist that Aristotle didn’t take essential 
predication (i.e. what would correspond to the ‘said of’ –connection) to be a relational 
matter to begin with. Some think that Aristotle replaced Plato’s relational account of 
predication with a ‘non-relational’ one, at least in the case of essential predication: while 
Plato thought that, e.g., Socrates’ being a man was a matter of Socrates’ standing in a 
relation (of ‘participation’) to the form Man, Aristotle (it is said) rejected such an 
explanation, and held that Socrates’ being a man is not a matter of two entities being 
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related (see G. Fine 1983 for discussion; Fine has particularly in mind Matthews and 
Cohen’s (1968) interpretation of Aristotle).  
 
But the present interpretation of the OS, while it does take ‘said of’ to be a relation of 
some kind, yet takes primary substances to be what they are independently of both 
relations. Now, Matthews and Cohen present the following dilemma for relational 
accounts of essential predication: either Socrates is what he is independently of having 
man etc. predicated of him, and is thus a ‘bare individual’; or he is what he is only in 
relation to something else, and is thus a ‘mere relational entity’ (Matthews and Cohen 
1968: 643–44). The first horn seems to be incompatible with Aristotle’s essentialism 
(with the view that Socrates could not have been, e.g., a dog or a turnip), the second with 
the very notion of substance as an ‘independent’ entity (G. Fine 1983: 229–30). Note, 
though, that ‘relationality’ is in these terms problematic only from the point of view of 
primary substance. It is unproblematic for secondary substances to be related by 
predication to primary substances in that the dilemma does not arise for them: there is no 
pressure against taking secondary substances to be ‘relational entities’, for Aristotle does 
take them to be ‘dependent’. Thus, if one adopts an interpretation on which the nature of 
primary substances does not involve any relational connections, but in which the rest of 
the categories are defined as being related to primary substance, one may admit that 
primary and secondary substances are intimately connected through predication without 
compromising the status of primary substances as independent entities. At any rate, some 
place must be found for secondary substances and the ‘said of’ –connection, for Aristotle 
does posit them. Matthews and Cohen’s criticism, if taken too far, risks pushing 
secondary substances (and universal accidents) into the margin, and eventually out of the 
whole system: indeed, Matthews and Cohen go as far as to say that ‘there being the 
secondary substance cat is a matter of there being individual cats’ (1968: 632; quoted in 
G. Fine 1983: 244).  
 
Let us now return to the general issue of the ‘real definition’ of categories on the present 
view. From the difference in ‘essential involvement’ between primary and secondary 
substances that we have just discussed there would seem to follow a difference in 
fundamentality: secondary substances (and particular and universal accidents, too) are, 
after all, supposed to be ‘derived’ entities in a clear sense, while primary substances are 
supposed to be ‘underived’. The sense of ‘fundamentality’ here, however, would seem to 
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have nothing to do with the one I discussed in the Introduction. To see why, note that 
particular accidents, for example, are taken to be ‘derived’ entities — and in that sense 
‘non-fundamental’ — but that they nevertheless also seem to belong to the complete and 
non-redundant set of truthmakers; for primary substances as such would not seem, in 
Aristotle’s ontology, to necessitate accidental truths like that Socrates is pale. Again, one 
could, as I will in fact do in the next section, take there to be no difference in 
‘fundamentality’ between particulars and universals (by taking there to be reciprocal 
essential involvement) while holding on to the view that substances and accidents are 
necessarily of the kinds that they are, i.e. that Socrates himself necessitates the truth that 
he is a man, and this redness the truth that it is a color, and thus that particulars suffice as 
truthmakers.  
 
Can one produce a compromise between these two notions of fundamentality? I think we 
could qualify the ‘non-redundancy’ condition for the truthmaking basis (or change what 
‘redundancy’ means in this context) so that, even if e.g. particulars on their own do suffice 
to necessitate all true kind-predications, universals would still be admitted as well if 
particulars essentially involved them.29 Particulars too, we might think, are in fact 
‘relational entities’, and their being the kind that they are a relational matter; Socrates ‘as 
such’ might be taken to be an ‘incomplete’ entity, ‘essentially related’ to the secondary 
substances man and animal (cf. G. Fine 1983: 246); Socrates on his own would, then, not 
qualify as a sufficient ground for the truth that he is a man, although this truth would 
follow necessarily from his existence, for this necessitation would clearly just express 
dependence of Socrates on something else, which something (secondary substance) one 
surely could not then leave out when giving the relevant ontological account. Why 
‘externalize’ in such a way the essential kinds of particulars is, however, a different 
question — as is, in the present connection, whether such ‘externalization’ is actually 
compatible with what Aristotle says so that it might be allowed in an interpretation of the 
OS (see however G. Fine 1983). Nevertheless, this is in fact how primary substances are 
understood on the interpretation given in the next section. I am, then, prepared to admit 
more entities in the truthmaking basis I talked of in the Introduction than what mere 
considerations of the necessitation of truths would allow. On the other hand, I am not at 
all ready to exclude truthmakers from the fundamental level only because they are 
                                                          
29
 As pointed out above in 2.33, the concept of truthmaking itself may, and indeed probably does, require 
some modification from the initial intuitive account in terms of necessitation. 
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‘derived’ entities. If something is required to ‘fix’ (i.e. necessitate) some truths, then it 
must, I believe, be part of the fundamental level. Thus particular accidents must be 
counted as fundamental even if primary substances do not essentially involve them. 
However, one could very well establish some kind of hierarchy among the entities of the 
fundamental level and admit that in some sense ‘derived’ entities like accidents are ‘less 
fundamental’ or ‘basic’.30 
 
On the view under discussion, then, Aristotle’s OS is a category system that is 
hierarchically ordered. This hierarchy is hierarchy in ‘real definition’ or in ‘essential 
involvement’ among the categories. The role of the two relations in the system is to allow 
for the ‘derivation’ of further categories (universals and accidents) from an ‘underived’, 
‘undefined’ category (primary substances). The order of ‘derivation’, beginning with the 
category (or categories) that is itself (or are themselves) ‘underived’, establishes an order 
of ‘fundamentality’, or of ‘derivedness’, among the categories. The notion of 
‘fundamentality’ here is largely independent of the one I used in the Introduction. A 
category of entities required to necessitate truths could be ‘derived’ or ‘underived’. I have 
proposed above to combine these notions of ‘fundamentality’ into one in which the idea 
of necessitation nevertheless remains in leading position. On the other hand, one could 
also adopt the new notion as the notion of ‘fundamentality’. Now, what the effect of this, 
I believe, would be is that there would appear to be less ‘fundamental’ entities than on 
my view but, on the other hand, that it also would be much more plausible to take there 
to be ‘non-fundamental’ ones. 
 
To illustrate this, take an author whom I believe to be one contemporary advocate of an 
approach to metaphysics in which one aims at constructing this kind of a category system, 
Jonathan Schaffer (see his 2009). On Schaffer’s ‘neo-Aristotelian’ conception of 
metaphysics, the goal of the discipline is to find out what the ‘substances’ or fundamental 
entities and ‘grounding relations’ are, and what the ‘hierarchy of being’ (ordered by the 
grounding relations according to ‘priority in nature’) that they ‘generate’ is like (2009: 
                                                          
30
 On the other hand, if one takes primary substances to be existentially dependent, even if only 
generically, on accidents, I think there is a case to be made that primary substances should then also be 
taken to essentially involve accidents (in their categorial nature at least, that is). This is because I suspect 
that all existential dependency connections should actually be explained in terms of essential 
involvement. At any rate, necessary connections between distinct entities should probably not be taken as 
brute. 
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351, 354). The ‘primary’ or fundamental entities are ‘all God would need to create’ (ibid.: 
351), i.e. they determine in some way all of being (although they do not, apparently, 
necessitate all the facts; I’ll come to this in a moment); yet the grounding relations31 
‘generate’ on the basis of the fundamental entities ‘an abundant superstructure’ of further 
entities that are ‘posterior’ to and ‘derivative’ from them (ibid.: 351, 354). Moreover, 
Schaffer says explicitly that ‘categories just are ways things depend on substances’ (ibid.: 
355), and that ‘[c]ategories are places in the dependence ordering’ (ibid.: 356). According 
to Schaffer, moreover, this view of categories can be ‘plausibly attributed to Aristotle’ 
(ibid.: 355). 
 
For Schaffer, to ask what is ‘fundamental’ is not, as it in effect is for me, to ask what 
really exists — indeed, the very point of his 2009 is to argue that metaphysicians should 
not be concerned with existence questions (whether something exists), which he thinks 
can usually be answered with a trivial ‘Yes’ (see e.g. Schaffer 2009: 359), but with 
‘fundamentality’ questions (whether something is ‘fundamental’). Nor does what is 
‘fundamental’ for Schaffer even seem to coincide with what is required to necessitate the 
worldly facts. For example, Schaffer seems to interpret Aristotle’s primary substance in 
terms of his own notion of ‘fundamentality’ as the only ‘fundamental’ type of entity in 
Aristotle’s system (ibid.: 351, 355–56). But, as I noted above, it is doubtful that one could 
take Aristotle’s primary substances as entities that necessitate all truths, including 
accidental predications32. Thus Schaffer’s conception of ‘fundamentality’, and of 
‘fundamental category’ in particular, differs from the one I have advocated. Schaffer can 
take the ‘fundamental level’ to be much sparser than I can, for fundamental entities need 
not on his view necessitate all truths. But on the other hand, he admits in his ontology 
much more types of entity than I would ever be ready to admit. 
 
How precisely should what is ‘underived’, the ‘root’ of the ‘hierarchy of being’, be 
understood? What are the ‘fundamental’ entities here if they are not the ones that 
necessitate all worldly truths? Perhaps some light can be shed on the idea of ‘hierarchy 
                                                          
31
 For Schaffer, these relations are apparently themselves entities: any ‘alleged entity’, he says, is either a 
‘substance’, or a ‘grounded’ entity, or a grounding relation (2009: 354). Grounding relations are thus, it 
seems, neither fundamental nor grounded entities, which is rather perplexing. 
32
 This is not to say, however, that Schaffer would not take there to be a close connection between 
truthmaking and fundamentality (see 2009: 365, 375). Instead, he seems merely to reject the association 
of truthmaking with necessitation. Schaffer explicitly argues against the view that truthmaking is (or 
entails) necessitation in his 2008. 
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of being’ and the notion of ‘fundamentality’ involved in it if we connect these with 
Aristotle’s idea of the ‘focal meaning’ (using the term from Owen 1960) of being (this 
connection is made by Schaffer himself, see 2009: 355–56). According to this idea, not 
everything that ‘is’ ‘is’ in the same sense; some things (primary substances) ‘are’ in the 
‘absolute’ and primary sense, and everything else ‘is’ merely insofar as it is in relation to 
what ‘is’ in the primary sense. ‘Being’ is like ‘healthy’ (to use a traditional example): 
‘healthy’ is a ‘systematically ambiguous’ term that applies in different ways to animals, 
to the food they eat, and to the urine they excrete; yet of these different senses, the one in 
which ‘healthy’ applies to animals is the central and primary one; for ‘healthy’ in the 
other senses is defined in terms of this (and some sort of causal relation); food is ‘healthy’ 
insofar as it promotes health in animals, and urine is ‘healthy’ by being a sign of the health 
of the animal that excreted it. In a similar way, ‘being’ could be taken to apply in different 
ways to the different ‘beings’ in the OS, for example: e.g. particular accidents could be 
taken to ‘be’ only insofar as they are present in what primarily ‘is’, i.e. primary substance 
(see Berti 2001 for a good overview of the discussion on the ‘focal meaning’ of ‘being’ 
in Aristotle.)  
 
The idea of such ‘analogy of being’ (as it is also called) may seem rather perplexing. 
What precisely can it mean to say that the ‘being’, or ‘existence’, of accidents (for 
example) is not of the same sort as, and is somehow ‘secondary’ in relation to, the ‘being’ 
or ‘existence’ of primary substances? ‘Derivation’ of entities is perhaps easy to 
understand; but here it is not merely the entities themselves that are supposed to be 
‘derived’ but, in a sense, their ‘being’ or ‘existence’ as well. But what does this mean? 
Now, it was, apparently, the purpose of Aristotle’s doctrine of the ‘focal meaning’ of 
‘being’ to allow him to say that the science of being has a unitary subject-matter without 
having to take being as a common genus (which would lead to serious problems) (see e.g. 
Shields 2015, Sect. 5, Cohen 2012, Sect. 3). How is this supposed to be achieved? All the 
things that ‘are’ (insofar as they ‘are’) fall, of course, into the purview of the science of 
being. But, in a sense, it is only substance that forms its ultimate subject-matter; for 
Aristotle seems to think that an accident like Socrates’ paleness, for example, ‘is’ only 
insofar as Socrates (a substance) is pale, and similarly, that the species man ‘is’ only 
insofar as some substances are men, and so on. To talk about paleness is, then, really only 
to talk about pale substances. Substance is not only the ‘underived’ or ‘root’ category, it 
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is also the ‘focal’ category (see Schaffer 2009: 356): that is, it forms something like the 
ultimate subject-matter; all facts ‘focus’ on substances by being ultimately ‘about’ them. 
 
This would also give a very good reason for being maximally permissive (as Schaffer is) 
about ontology. For if the being or existence of the species man, for example, is, so to 
say, simply Socrates’ (or someone else’s) being a man (i.e. not another thing but rather 
just ‘how’ Socrates or someone else is from a certain point of view), then it must be 
obviously (it seems, in fact, analytically) true that the species exists if it is indeed true that 
someone is a man. That the fact of Socrates’ being a man does not (perhaps) require the 
existence of a species to necessitate it is here irrelevant. However, the being of 
‘derivative’ entities may also seem to be excessively ‘deflated’ here. The existence of 
species etc. is supposed to be ‘improper’ or ‘qualified’; but does not this simply mean 
that they do not in fact exist properly speaking? The reason I have propounded this view 
of the ‘being’ of ‘derived’ entities is, nevertheless, that it seems to me to provide a very 
suitable background for the conception of metaphysics as concerned with what is 
‘derived’ and what ‘underived’, when this is not understood as a concern with what 
entities provide the basis for the necessitation of all facts. The ‘fundamental’ entities are 
here those that these facts are really ’about’. 
 
Such a view of ‘fundamentality’, and of what the ‘fundamental’ categories are, I, 
however, reject. It seems, on the other hand, to fit Aristotle’s OS very well. Primary 
substances are supposed to be the only ‘independent’ entities. This is problematic if the 
‘independence’ is interpreted in terms of necessitation: primary substances do not seem 
to necessitate all the facts. But at the very least all facts certainly seem to ‘center’ on 
primary substances and to be ‘about’ them. Thus the essence of all the other sorts of entity 
is naturally taken to unilaterally involve primary substances, to be ‘derived’ from these. 
What results is a hierarchy of being in which primary substances hold the privileged 
position of ‘primary’, ‘underived’ entities, the ultimate ‘subjects’ of facts. I will next turn 
to another interpretation of Aristotle’s OS which is perhaps less plausible as an 
interpretation, but which is more congenial to my view of fundamental categories. It also 
involves an interesting view of the role of relations in category systems. 
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3.112 ‘Network of relations’ 
 
On another view, the notion of ‘subject’ plays no special role but, as Ackrill (2002: 76) 
puts it, ‘it is the notions of “said of” and “in” […] which bear the weight of the distinctions 
Aristotle is drawing’: ‘subject’ is ‘a mere label for whatever has anything “said of” or 
“in” it’ (loc. cit.). The ‘ties’, on this view, somehow do on their own all the work of 
distinguishing the categories. An interpretation of Aristotle’s OS along these lines could 
go, roughly, as follows. The two ‘ties’ define each two ‘roles’ which an entity can fill, 
corresponding to the positions or ‘argument places’ in the ‘ties’ — what inheres (I), 
subject of inherence (SI), what is predicated (P), subject of predication (SP)33; the four 
categories are distinguished in terms of which of these roles the entities in them have or 
do not have. A full assignment of ‘roles’ to the entities in the four categories requires 
more information than what we have in Aristotle’s text, but something like the following 
can be given (this assignment of roles largely follows Angelelli 1967: 13 in which the 
four categories are described in a similar way):  
 
 1. ~I, SI, P, SP 
 2. I, ~SI, ~P, SP 
 3. I, ~SI, P, SP 
 4. ~I, SI, ~P, SP 
 
(Note, again, that primary substances (type 4) are here taken to stand in the ’ties’ in the 
same way as entities in the rest of the categories; entities in all four categories are similarly 
defined34, qua members of their category, by the ‘roles’ they have or do not have.) In fact, 
though, this formulation of the idea is not quite satisfactory as it is. This is because 
nothing determines here which subject of inherence category goes with which inhering 
entity category, or which subject of predication category goes with which predicated 
                                                          
33
 Remember that ‘subject’ here is nothing but a ‘label’ (for a position in a relation); an independent 
‘subject’ category is in no way involved. 
34
 I am talking here, as in the previous section, of so-called ‘real definitions’ —  that is, of the 
‘definitions’ of the categories themselves (or of entities qua members of them), not of linguistic 
expressions signifying them. 
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entity category. But what we would like is, of course, for substantial universals (type 1), 
for example, to be predicated of primary substances (type 4), not of particular accidents 
(type 2), and for particular accidents to inhere in primary substances, not in substantial 
universals. To achieve this, we will need to add to the above characterizations by also 
specifying what other roles the entities with the correlative roles have or do not have; 
e.g., primary substance must not only be characterized as a subject of predication, but as 
a subject of predication for something that does not inhere in anything, for example. 
 
It is also to be noted that the categories in the OS can in Aristotle’s version only be 
distinguished, as above, by specifying the roles entities have and the roles they do not 
have. Particulars (whether substantial or accidental) are not distinguished from the 
universals ‘said of’ them by their filling the role of subjects of predication, for, on 
Aristotle’s view, species too (e.g. man and redness) have something ‘said of’ them, 
namely their genera (e.g. animal, color). To distinguish particulars from universals, one 
must, then, add the further characteristic that particulars are not predicated (even if we 
bring in all the other roles involved particulars still cannot be distinguished without 
specifying the roles they lack). In the purest realization of the view of category systems 
discussed here, only the positions or ‘roles’ actually occupied by entities would need to 
be mentioned (Lowe’s version of the OS discussed later seems to be such a system). 
 
Why adhere to the present interpretation of Aristotle’s OS? If the OS is to be taken as a 
system of fundamental categories, in my sense, it would seem natural to interpret the ‘said 
of’ and ‘present in’ –relations as ontological connections (‘formal ontological relations’) 
that must be invoked in giving an ontological account of two different sorts of predication: 
essential predication (kind-predication), as in ‘Socrates is a man’ or ‘Redness is a color’, 
would be analyzed in terms of one thing being ‘said of’ another (man being ‘said of’ 
Socrates, or color of redness), and accidental predication, as in ‘Socrates is wise’, in 
terms of one thing being ‘present in’ another (wisdom being ‘present in’ Socrates) (such 
a connection between types of predication and the relations is made, e.g., in Koslicki 
2013: 36). On the other hand, as I already noted in the previous section, at least in the 
case of essential predication it is not obvious that such a ‘relational account’ is actually 
compatible with what Aristotle says. Primary substances are supposed to be ‘independent’ 
in some way, and entities in the rest of the categories are supposed to be ‘dependent’ on 
primary substances. But can this asymmetry be respected if the ontological analysis of 
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essential predications about primary substances (i.e. of their ‘being just what they are’) 
involves a connection of primary substances to something else? 
 
But whether or not the present take on the OS works as an interpretation of Aristotle, it 
represents, I think, at least a viable general sort of approach to category ontology (I will 
nevertheless continue to use Aristotle’s OS as an example). On the view under discussion, 
then, all categories are on the same level as regards the way they are defined or 
distinguished: they all ‘essentially involve’ each other. Primary substance, for example, 
is essentially characterized as a ‘subject of predication’, and so the category of secondary 
substances, which bear the correlative role of ‘something that is predicated’, is implicated 
in its essence35. Thus there is, from this point of view, no hierarchy (the relations can on 
the other hand induce their own hierarchical order; see the next section). But some may 
suspect that there is a vicious circularity involved in such reciprocal ‘essential 
involvement’, especially as there is apparently supposed to be distinction or 
‘individuation’ of a number of items in terms of each other. It should be noted, however, 
that the categories (or entities qua members of these categories) are here not supposed to 
be directly defined or ‘individuated’ in terms of each other. In the type of category system 
discussed in the previous section, universals and accidents were directly defined in terms 
of primary substances. This was also possible, because the category of primary substances 
was itself not supposed to be defined in terms of anything else. Here, by contrast, one 
category is defined in terms of another only insofar as both are directly defined in terms 
of a single relationship which holds between them36. 
 
How precisely should one understand this definition of several items in terms of a 
relationship? One way is perhaps through Kit Fine’s idea of ‘collective essence’ or 
‘nature’ (see K. Fine 1995a: 242–43, 249–50; 1995c: 65). Take Fine’s example of the 
fictional characters Jeeves and Wooster: as Fine says, it is, on a certain view of the 
individuation of creatures of fiction, ‘essential to both, considered together, that the one 
is valet to the other’ (K. Fine 1995b: 282–83; italics mine). In this way, one seems to 
                                                          
35
 As I already pointed out, in order for the category implicated to come out right here — for it to be, in 
this case for example, that of substantial universals instead of that of accidental universals — it must be 
part of the essence of a category that the category with the correlative role has such and such other roles 
as well. 
36
 I sometimes speak loosely of relations between categories, but what the relations strictly speaking hold 
of are of course the entities in the categories. 
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avoid the circularity that would be involved if one said instead that it is part of the nature 
of Jeeves to be valet to Wooster, and part of the nature of Wooster to have Jeeves as a 
valet. It is important to note, however, that, even if the ‘real definition’ of items that 
‘essentially involve’ each other — like Jeeves and Wooster, or the categories of the OS 
— must be taken as ‘simultaneous’ or ‘collective’ (in order to avoid circularity), nothing 
prevents us from taking the corresponding claims about the individual items themselves 
(e.g. that primary substances have secondary substances said of them, and that secondary 
substances are said of primary substances) as logical consequences of this collective ‘real 
definition’. The circularity is a problem only in essential truths that belong to the so-called 
constitutive essence, not in those that belong to mere consequential essence (for this 
distinction see Fine 1995c: 56–58, 1995b: 276). We can then indeed say that there is 
reciprocal dependence and essential involvement between such ‘simultaneously defined’ 
items and at the same time avoid vicious circularity, namely when we understand 
‘essence’ ‘consequentially’ (Fine 1995c: 66). 
 
Another potential way to conceive of the ‘definition’ of a number of items in terms of 
certain relations between them, that I take to be closely related to Fine’s idea of ‘collective 
essence’, is one based on the idea of ‘structure’, using as a model here the idea of 
mathematical structure as it is used by structuralists in the philosophy of mathematics. 
The structuralists’ core idea is that the nature of mathematical objects — e.g. of sets or of 
numbers — is wholly determined by their occupying (or being) certain positions in certain 
structures — e.g. in the natural number structure, in the case of natural numbers (see e.g. 
Shapiro 1997, Chap. 3). How is this determination or ‘individuation’ to be understood? 
As Øystein Linnebo (2008: 68) notes, at least some structuralists seem to hold that there 
is in the realm of the mathematical what Linnebo calls ‘upwards dependence’: that 
mathematical objects ontologically depend on the structure itself to which they belong 
(we met, in fact, a similar idea above in 2.33 when discussing the views of Francois 
Clementz on internal relations). It would thus be the structure itself, as an item somehow 
additional to what is structured, that determined the nature of the relevant entities. But 
what, in fact, is a ‘structure’? Both Stewart Shapiro (1997: passim) and Michael Resnik 
(1997) also talk of ‘patterns’. A ‘pattern’ is characterized by Resnik (1997: 202–3) as 
something consisting of ‘positions’ standing in ‘various relationships’; a ‘position’, 
furthermore, ‘has no distinguishing features other than those it has in virtue of being the 
particular position it is in the pattern to which it belongs’ (ibid.: 203). It seems to me that 
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the structures or ‘patterns’ on which mathematical objects are supposed to depend are to 
be identified either with the structuring or ‘patterning’ ‘relationships’ themselves, or with 
some sort of ‘holistically’ conceived ‘complex’ of which the objects or ‘positions’ are 
‘parts’. The ‘upwards dependence’ claim in both of these guises is bound to be 
controversial, however. The idea that relata could depend for their identity on the relation 
holding of them has for example been questioned by Geoffrey Hellman in his criticism 
of certain forms of structuralism (Hellman 2001). Linnebo paraphrases Hellman’s 
criticism as follows: 
 
 This, I submit, is a vicious circularity: the structuralists claim that the 
 identity of the relata is grounded in that of the relation; but any grounding 
 of the identity of a relation presupposes that the relata have already and 
 independently had their identities grounded. (Linnebo 2008: 70).  
 
 
Now, certainly if one conceives of relations, for example, as sets of ordered pairs, or if 
one pictures a relational ‘complex’ as something arising from the ‘functional application’ 
of a many-place predicate to independently given terms, the idea that a relation or a 
‘complex’ could individuate its relata or constituents will appear to get things the wrong 
way around. But I at least am not convinced that such conceptions of relations — as, in 
effect, ‘external’ — have no viable alternatives. Structuralists, it seems to me, should 
view their structuring or patterning relations as, in some sense, ‘internal’. 
 
Let us turn from mathematical structures to what one would call ‘categorial structures’. 
The OS, for example, would be best taken as a single structure with two relationships 
(‘present in’ and ‘said of’, or inherence and predication) — as I noted above, the 
categories are not sufficiently characterized by specifying merely what direct relational 
connections they have or do not have (even if this is in fact sufficient to distinguish them 
from each other). In Aristotle’s version, in which there are ‘higher-order’ universals 
(genera and species) which are themselves ‘subjects’ of which something ‘is said’, there 
is also in fact a whole family of both secondary substance and universal accident 
categories of different ‘orders’37. The structure would, then, perhaps be more complex 
than what one at first thought. But a more important issue than what the structure would 
                                                          
37
 How many there are is a question best left unanswered. For Aristotle, at any rate, there is always a 
‘highest genus’ and a ‘lowest species’, and the predication orders formed by the genera and species would 
not seem to be ‘dense’ on his view. So we can safely say that, for Aristotle at least, their number is finite. 
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be in the case of Aristotle’s OS (which would, thus, perhaps not be a simple ‘square’ after 
all) is here the general question of what kind of a thing such a ‘categorial structure’ should 
be taken to be. Are we to imagine some complex relationship, taken as an entity, on which 
entities in the categories would depend? Or should the entities be taken as ‘aspects’ of a 
prior whole? Although I am in fact sympathetic to the idea of something like ‘category 
structuralism’ (see 3.2. below), I am not sure how ‘categorial structure’ should be 
understood, especially if one is to have no ontological commitment to anything called 
‘categorial structures’ over and above the structured entities themselves (the entities in 
the categories)38. 
 
As I noted in the previous section as well, one must remember that what we are concerned 
with here is merely the categorial nature of entities. Even if the essence of things qua 
members of their categories can be given in purely relational terms, this does not mean 
that their whole essence or nature could be thus given. Adhering to a category system of 
the present sort does not, then, mean giving up ‘objects’ with intrinsic nature (à la ‘Ontic 
Structural Realism’; see Ladyman 2014, Sect. 4). On the other hand, it does mean giving 
up (absolutely) independent entities. Insofar as the category of an entity is an 
indispensable component in the latter’s ‘identity’, to that extent the ‘categorial’ relation 
also ‘individuates’ its relata (even if this is not necessarily ‘full individuation’). Another 
thing that must be noted is that ‘categorial’ structures would not be, so to say, purely 
‘structural’. They could be said to be ‘formal’, too, at most in the sense I attempted to 
characterize in Chapter 2. Shapiro (1997: 100) characterizes mathematical structures as 
‘freestanding’, as knowing no restrictions in what sorts of entities can instantiate them. 
Some of the ‘formal ontological relations’ I mentioned in Chapter 2 would perhaps 
constitute structures of such ‘freestanding’ nature; but ‘categorial’ relations — the likes 
of ‘said of’ and ‘present in’ — certainly would not. For these are supposed to be relations 
which induce a distinction of category between the entities of which they hold, so that 
                                                          
38
 Not all forms of ‘structuralism’ are, however, ontologically committed to structures. I think ‘category 
structuralism’ should not ontologically commit us either to ‘structures’ or to ‘categories’. For this reason, 
if one looks to mathematical structuralism for inspiration, one should perhaps focus on the ‘eliminative’ 
versions (see e.g. Shapiro 1997: 9). Categories, the places in ‘categorial structures’, should not be 
conceived as ‘objects’, but as ‘offices’ (to use Shapiro’s term, see e.g. 1997: 10): when we talk about 
categories being related and so forth, we should take ourselves to be really talking in generalizations 
about the ‘officeholders’, i.e. the entities in the categories (cf. Shapiro 1997: 85). There is at least one 
crucial difference, though: whereas eliminative structuralism of numbers, for example, obviously makes 
no claims about the individuation of the entities ‘playing the role’ of numbers, ‘eliminative structuralism 
of categories’, on the other hand, crucially would make claims about how the identities of the entities 
playing the ‘categorial roles’ depend on each other. 
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they never apply except to certain sorts of entities (although it would be misleading to put 
the matter by saying that they require certain sorts of entities as their range of application, 
as the sorts are not supposed to be determined independently of the relations themselves). 
 
The present way of conceiving of the definition of categories in terms of relations is, then, 
certainly of independent interest, even if it does not fit Aristotle’s OS very well. If the 
interpretation in the previous section took the OS as a ‘hierarchy of being’, the present 
one could be said to take it as, at bottom, a ‘network of relations’. The categories are here 
‘positions’ or ‘nodes’ in a structure of relations which applies to or structures the entities 
which we say are ‘members of’ or ‘in’ the categories. As categories are essential to their 
‘members’, so the relations here must be essential to the entities they relate. It follows 
that all entities are somehow interdependent. I will discuss the idea involved here of 
‘relational accounts’ of categories or category distinctions further in the last section of 
this chapter, along with certain objections that can be raised against it. Before that, I will 
say something about Lowe’s version of OS. 
 
 
3.12 Lowe’s version of the Ontological Square 
 
The most important recent defender of the OS as a realistic system of ontological 
categories is undoubtedly E. J. Lowe (particularly in his 2006). We need not go here into 
all the details of Lowe’s version nor to his reasons for adhering to it. What is important 
for our purposes in Lowe’s version of the OS is the central role he gives in it to formal 
ontological relations and the way he proposes to use them to ‘capture’ the category 
distinctions within it. I will also look at Lowe’s claim that, in some sense, substances 
form the most ‘fundamental’ category. 
 
Whereas the original OS in Aristotle is, as we saw, perhaps best interpreted as being 
hierarchically organized with respect to how the categories in it are ‘generated’ — as 
having a category of primary substances that is independent from the ‘ties’, from which 
the rest are derived in terms of these — Lowe’s version seems to have no privileged 
category in this sense. Instead, all the categories in it seem to be equally determined in 
terms of formal ontological relations. I will thus treat Lowe’s version of the OS as an 
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example of a category system characterized in terms of a ‘network of relations’. On the 
other hand, Lowe also seems to think that, in some sense, his system does have a ‘root’ 
category. 
 
In the preface to his 2006, Lowe introduces the ‘four-category ontology’ or OS as 
 
 a system of ontology which recognizes two fundamental categorial 
 distinctions which cut across each other to generate four fundamental 
 ontological categories, these distinctions being between the particular and 
 the universal and between the substantial and the non-substantial. (2006: 
 v; original italics) 
 
Later in the book, Lowe says the following concerning the two ‘fundamental categorial 
distinctions’ (with some terminological differences): 
 
 […] the best way, in my view, to capture the traditional distinction 
 between particulars and universals is by appeal to the instantiation 
 relation. Universals are entities that are instantiated — that is they have 
 instances — while particulars are the entities that instantiate them. (ibid.: 
 114; emphasis of the whole sentence mine) 
 
 Similarly, I consider that the traditional distinction between subjects and 
 predicables [i.e. substances and ‘non-substances’] is best captured by 
 reference to the characterization relation. Subjects are entities that are 
 characterized, while predicables are the entities that characterize them 
 (loc. cit.; emphasis of the whole sentence again mine) 
 
Hence, Lowe seems to adhere to the sort of view in which the two categorial distinctions 
of the OS, which combine or ‘cut across each other’ to give the four categories, are taken 
to be determined (‘captured’, as he says) purely in terms of the positions in two relations 
corresponding to the traditional predication and inherence ‘ties’ (called by Lowe 
‘instantiation’ and ‘characterization’, respectively)39. Moreover, Lowe seems to prefer 
the simple version of this view, on which one need only specify what positions entities 
occupy to distinguish the categories so that one need not add anything about the positions 
they do not occupy. But he recognizes that this is possible only if there are no ‘higher-
order’ universals or ‘predicables’. Speaking in another chapter less discriminatingly about 
                                                          
39
 Ultimately, one should ‘capture’ the four categories as well, and not just the two combining categorial 
distinctions on their own, in terms of the relations. As we saw in 3.112, it is not enough just to extract the 
positions from the two relations and then determine the four categories as combinations of these 
positions. See however e.g. Lowe 2006: 117. 
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‘objects’ and ‘properties’, Lowe suggests taking ‘objects’ to be ‘property-bearers’, but, 
in order to secure the ‘absoluteness’ of the ‘object’-‘property’ –distinction independently 
of the question of ‘higher-order’ properties, also says that one may add the explicit 
requirement that ‘objects’ also not be capable of being themselves ‘borne’ (2006: 70–72). 
Yet Lowe is in fact skeptical of all ‘higher-order’ properties and includes none in his 
system (see e.g. 2006: 42, 72, 79, 114). 
 
Taking all categories to be distinguished — ‘simultaneously’, as it were — in terms of 
positions in relations has, as we have seen, consequences for their status as to 
fundamentality (in at least some sense of ‘fundamental’). Two categories of which each 
essentially involves the other are necessarily ‘on the same level’ in some sense. Now, 
Lowe does indeed take all four categories to be ‘fundamental’ (see for example the first 
of the above quotations). But what does Lowe take this ‘fundamentality’ of categories to 
amount to? To say that a category is ‘fundamental’ is, he thinks, to say 
 
 that the existence and identity conditions of entities belonging to that 
 category cannot be exhaustively specified in terms of ontological 
 dependency relations between those entities and entities belonging to other 
 categories. (2006: 8) 
 
‘Fundamentality’ of categories, as I have proposed to understand it, is related precisely to 
the existence conditions of entities. In effect, the ‘fundamental’ entities are for me those 
the existence of which does not ‘supervene’ or follow necessarily from the existence of 
other entities (unless, that is, they are involved in the essence of the entities which 
necessitate their existence; see 3.111 above) and which also themselves necessitate all the 
worldly facts. Identity conditions, on the other hand, I have not taken to be relevant to 
‘fundamentality’. Now, there is plausibly a sense of ‘fundamentality’ to which identity 
conditions are relevant. But if Lowe’s four categories are all supposed to be 
‘fundamental’, the sense in which they are so cannot be one which involves not having 
identity conditions specifiable in terms of dependence on entities in other categories; for 
Lowe takes the identity conditions of modes and kinds, two of the four categories, to be 
specifiable in terms of dependence (so-called ‘identity dependence’, an asymmetrical 
relation of essential dependence) on entities of other categories (2006: 116–17). 
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Now Lowe does also say that the category of individual substances is ‘in a certain sense 
the most fundamental’ (adding: ‘even though in another sense all four of our categories 
are equally “basic”’) (2006: 21). This ‘fundamentality’ of individual substances is 
apparently understood in terms of identity dependence. Identity dependence creates a 
difference in ‘fundamentality’ between the entities it relates, because it is asymmetrical: 
one of the entities related by identity dependence is always subordinate in ontological 
status to the other, because it depends for its identity, for its being the very entity it is, on 
the other, while the other does not depend in a similar way on it (see ibid.: 35). Now, it is 
clear that Lowe succeeds in creating at least ‘local’ hierarchy in his system with this sort 
of dependence. Modes are less ‘fundamental’ than individual substances and kinds less 
‘fundamental’ than property and relational universals. But I am not sure that Lowe 
succeeds in creating a ‘global’ hierarchy in which individual substances alone would form 
the ground-level. For it seems that to achieve this he would need to establish a 
subordination of property and relational universals under modes and of kind universals 
under substances as well; but while all universals are existentially dependent on 
particulars, so are all particulars on universals. Moreover, even though the existential 
dependence is rigid to one and generic to the other direction40, the stronger of these (rigid 
dependence) is actually in the direction of universals (ibid.: 117), so that if this establishes 
any hierarchy or subordination, it will be the wrong way around (Fraser MacBride (2004a: 
327) also notes this — in fact in the very article to which Lowe is replying in the section 
of Chapter 7 in his 2006 that I have just cited). 
 
But whether or not Lowe succeeds in giving the individual substances of his system a 
privileged status, he at least shows that there is a way to establish some sort of hierarchy 
even among categories that are, in another sense, equally ‘fundamental’. Identity 
dependence, in particular, establishes differences in ‘ontological status’ among categories 
while also allowing these to be all ‘non-supervenient’. I already recognized above that 
those differences in ‘fundamentality’ which arise from hierarchy in ‘real definition’ can 
be taken as differences among entities that are all ‘fundamental’ in a more important 
sense. Lowe, in a similar way, shows that among entities that all essentially involve each 
other there may still be difference in ‘fundamentality’, namely with respect to 
individuation (as e.g. between modes and substances in Lowe’s system), but also, it 
                                                          
40
 Lowe in fact completely ignores generic existential dependence when describing the ‘dependency 
patterns’ among the categories at the end of Chapter 7 of his 2006 (2006: 117). 
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seems, with respect to rigid existential dependence (as between the universals and 
particulars in Lowe’s system, although this difference does not happen to suit Lowe’s 
Aristotelian purposes). 
 
3.3 Objections to relational accounts of category distinctions 
 
In this final section, I will look at some potential problems with and objections that could 
be levelled against category systems like that of Lowe and the general idea of 
distinguishing categories purely through relations which is involved in them. Some 
further development of that idea is also found in this section. The discussion will mostly 
have as a starting point the criticisms of the use of relations in accounting for category 
distinctions — especially the particular-universal –distinction — that Fraser MacBride 
(2004a, 2004b, 2005) has presented in several places (MacBride’s line of criticism is 
heavily influenced by Frank Ramsey’s classic paper ‘Universals’ (1925).).  
 
In what follows, I will take it as given that all the relations used in distinguishing 
categories are associated with mutual ontological dependence (this could be taken to be 
just a consequence of the essentiality of categories to the entities in them when two 
categories are supposed to be essentially distinguished in terms of a relation), and also 
that (when they are asymmetrical) they apply in such a way that nothing ever occupies 
both positions in them, i.e. that there are no ‘higher-order’ connections (these conditions 
are met by Lowe’s version of the OS, for example; we can, I believe, ignore some of 
MacBride’s objections thanks to these suppositions). Now, take as a basis for discussion 
the following simple view of the distinction between particulars and universals, which is 
presented (but not endorsed) by MacBride: 
 
 […] particulars are entities that figure in the first argument position of the  
 [exemplification] relation; universals are entities that serve in the second. 
 (MacBride 2005: 595–96; see also 2004a: 323) 
 
 
Take the fact that Socrates exemplifies wisdom. According to the view under discussion, 
then, Socrates is a particular because he occupies the first argument position (the 
‘exemplifier’ position) of the exemplification relation, and wisdom is a universal because 
it occupies the second (the ‘what is exemplified’ position; what precisely ‘occupation of 
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positions in a relation’ means is here left undetermined, but I will come back to this 
question below). It should be clear that the exemplification relation must here be taken as 
asymmetrical. For otherwise it would sometimes happen that a exemplified b and b also 
exemplified a, and hence that something was both a universal and a particular. This would 
be contrary to the ‘categoriality’ of the classes of universals and of particulars (for 
‘exclusivity’ as a necessary condition for the ‘categoriality’ of a classification see 
Introduction). 
 
Now, it is above all just the putative asymmetry of the exemplification relation that 
MacBride finds problematic. He presents from this point of view (as it seems to me) two 
types of objection: the first type does not question the asymmetry of exemplification as 
such, but raises doubts as to whether this asymmetry has any clear sense; the second type 
queries the asymmetry itself, in particular whether there is any reason to suppose that 
facts have an asymmetrical structure at all. I will discuss these objections in turn. I will at 
the same time present other potential objections as well, not attributable to MacBride, 
when the occasion arises. 
 
The first sort of objection goes something like this (see MacBride 2005: 597, 2004a: 324; 
what follows is largely my own formulation, however). Grant first that exemplification is 
indeed asymmetrical. What we can say about exemplification is then at least that it is a 
relation (never mind here what ontological status it would have) that applies to each pair 
of entities that it applies to only in one ‘direction’ (or something to that effect; talk of 
‘positions’ actually allows us to make the point without talking about different 
‘directions’). This much follows, of course, just from the meaning of ‘asymmetrical 
relation’. Now, what we want is for this asymmetrical relation to ‘induce’ a distinction in 
category among the entities to which it applies; moreover, this distinction should be the 
one between universals and particulars, with each universal and particular being assigned 
to the right side of the divide. For this to be possible, each universal and particular must, 
of course, occupy the right ‘position’ in the relation. But what warrant do we actually 
have for taking this to be the case? Why should not the exemplification fact involving 
Socrates and wisdom rather be that wisdom exemplifies Socrates? To answer that it must 
be Socrates who exemplifies wisdom because Socrates is a particular and wisdom is a 
universal sounds circular. We could perhaps just stipulate that exemplification is a 
relation that applies in the right order. But surely the whole idea of distinguishing 
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particulars and universals through exemplification would then be pointless (one might 
also ask whether we actually could just stipulate that there is such a relation; this depends 
on what a ‘relation’ is here supposed to be). The notion of exemplification as such would, 
at any rate, seem to have too little content to determine which position can be taken to be 
occupied by which category of entity.  
 
Is this last claim correct? Is it true that exemplification is so impoverished a notion that it 
cannot confidently be taken to impose the right sort of order within facts consisting of 
universals and particulars? Impoverished or not as a whole, it would seem at least that 
that its putative asymmetry is indeed at most very superficial. For example, 
exemplification is usually taken to be many-many: one thing can exemplify many things 
and many things can exemplify one thing. This determines one feature in which both 
exemplifiers and ‘exemplifieds’ will be indiscernible: they will both be ‘one in many’, 
‘common to’ several other things (thus the idea, mentioned by both MacBride (2004a: 
318) and Lowe (2006: 108), that particulars and universals are mere ‘abstractions’ from, 
or ‘invariants across’, facts or states of affairs). Again, what exemplifies and what is 
exemplified are usually taken to depend on each other in exactly the same way (namely 
generically): what exemplifies requires merely something or other to exemplify, and what 
is exemplified merely something or other as an exemplifier. But if we fail in this way to 
find any further content to the claim that exemplification is asymmetrical41, then it would 
in fact seem to make no difference if we changed ‘a exemplifies b’ everywhere to ‘b 
exemplifies a’. 
 
But even if exemplification is indeed of meagre content, or does not in a sense involve 
enough asymmetry, it does not of course follow that all categorial relations or structures 
would share the same defects. Take Lowe’s instantiation and characterization relations, 
for example. The asymmetry of these relations would seem to have clear content. In 
particular, the dependencies that they ‘constitute’ (as Lowe puts it) are in each case 
themselves asymmetrical: instantiation ‘constitutes’ in each case a rigid existential 
dependence of what instantiates on the instantiated but mere non-rigid (generic) 
dependence of what is instantiated on what instantiates; characterization always 
‘constitutes’ an identity dependence, which is asymmetrical, although it is sometimes of 
                                                          
41
 One further question is whether there is a difference in how exemplifiers and ‘exemplifieds’ are 
spatiotemporally located. See MacBride 2004a: 318–21 
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what characterizes on what is characterized, and sometimes of what is characterized on 
what characterizes (see Lowe 2006: 117)42. Lowe argues explicitly that this allows him 
to meet an objection of MacBride’s in which it is claimed that he does not have enough 
resources to distinguish from each other, or ‘identify unambiguously’, the positions in the 
relational structure of the OS — what seems to be a variant, more or less, of the objection 
that has been under discussion (Lowe 2006: 115–16; the objection is presented in 
MacBride 2004a). 
 
The second type of objection MacBride presents goes further. Continuing with the 
example of the exemplification relation, it can be noted, first of all, that there seems in 
fact to be no need to take exemplification to be asymmetrical to begin with. For what is 
the point of exemplification if not simply to ‘bind together’ universals and particulars so 
that they constitute a fact (2005: 598) (compare with the idea of a ‘neutral connector’ I 
proposed at the end of the last chapter)? But mere connection or ‘binding together’ is of 
course symmetrical: if universals are connected with particulars, so are particulars with 
universals. What independent reason could we then have for taking facts to have 
‘structural asymmetry’, instead of taking them to consist of entities that are just 
symmetrically ‘bound together’? But if the structure of facts is symmetrical, then their 
constituents cannot have different sorts of ‘position’ in them which would provide a basis 
for distinguishing their categories (loc. cit.)  
 
Does this objection transfer in some form to Lowe’s instantiation or characterization, for 
example? Well, what is the point of these relations? Interestingly, it cannot be that of 
connecting or ‘binding together’, not in exactly the same way at least as with 
exemplification; for Lowe takes the entities that instantiation and characterization apply 
to not to stand in need of any external connecting. In part from this Lowe, somewhat 
tentatively (see below), concludes that instantiation and characterization are ontologically 
reducible to their relata. In fact, we light here upon the crucial question whether a 
relational account of a category distinction in general requires the relation involved to be 
an existent item additional to its relata. Indeed, immediately after presenting the objection 
just mentioned, MacBride presents the following. Perhaps universals and particulars are 
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 Although it is not to the present point, I should mention here that I worry what the consequences for the 
relational approach to category distinctions are when a relation is associated like this with dependence 
now in one, now in the other direction. 
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not in need of the ‘assistance’ of an exemplification relation at all: perhaps they are 
‘connected immediately’ (2005: 598). MacBride points at the fact that we need no distinct 
symbol to ‘depict’ an exemplification relation in a linguistic representation of the fact that 
Socrates exemplifies wisdom; all we need is ‘some concatenation device’, e.g. a colon that 
has no direction associated with it (loc. cit.) (When it comes to exemplification, I believe 
MacBride is definitely right that we do not need any asymmetrical relation as an 
additional entity; but, as I concluded above in 2.34, there is probably still a need for 
something like a ‘connector’). 
 
What MacBride seems to be saying here, is that if a relation is a mere matter of ‘immediate 
connection’ and not an additional entity, then the relation at least cannot be asymmetrical. 
That as such would of course mean that it cannot be used to draw a categorial distinction. 
But even if it could be shown that mere ‘concatenations’ and internal relations can 
somehow be meaningfully said to be asymmetrical, the further objection could perhaps 
be raised that one cannot claim to be drawing a category distinction in terms of a relation 
in the first place unless the relation is taken as an additional entity; for surely there is then 
no relation in terms of which to draw the distinction!43 
 
For someone like Lowe who denies that formal ontological relations correspond to 
distinct entities in reality these objections certainly seem to present a challenge. But what 
if we allow there to be such distinct entities (as I very tentatively did at the end of 2.34 
above, although I also suggested one could make do with one that was symmetrical)? 
Well, one could go further yet and question the very idea of letting something as intrinsic 
to a thing as its category to be determined by a relation. Are not the relations a thing 
stands in something purely extrinsic that at most ‘follow’ from the thing’s intrinsic nature, 
but which certainly themselves have no ‘influence’ of any kind on it? Perhaps we are 
even presented with something like a dilemma here — one that would be faced by anyone 
who wished to explain category distinctions relationally — when we combine this and an 
objection from above: either the relation in terms of which we want to explain a category 
distinction is not ‘really’ a relation at all but what corresponds to it in reality is merely 
something intrinsic, and so we do not really have a ‘relational account’; or it is ‘really’ a 
relation, but for this very reason it cannot play a part in determining something intrinsic 
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 See MacBride 2004a: 323. MacBride himself seems to think, though, that this objection is easily 
answered by simply switching to talk ‘at the level of truths’ (loc. cit.). I, however, am not so sure. 
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like the category of an entity; so it follows that it is impossible to explain category 
distinctions in terms of relations. I will primarily tackle this last objection in what follows, 
for it is certainly the most general, and say something about the rest — the ones that 
specifically concern asymmetry, or the lack thereof — only in passing. 
 
The objection is clearly premised at least on the ideas that (1) the category of an entity is 
something ‘intrinsic’ to it, and that (2) at least those relations that are supposed to account 
for category distinctions are always ‘extrinsic’. The ‘intrinsic’/’extrinsic’ –distinction is 
notoriously difficult to make clear (see Weatherson and Marshall 2012), but I believe it 
is here enough simply to agree on an uncontroversial (I hope) intuitive version: what is 
intrinsic (to a thing) involves merely the thing itself (and its parts); what is extrinsic (to a 
thing) involves something distinct (and disjoint) from the thing, some other thing, as well. 
In the light of this understanding of the distinction, it would seem to be easy to assent to 
(1) and (2). But then the conclusion that there cannot be relational accounts of category 
distinctions would also not seem to be far away. Is there a way to avoid this result?  
 
Let us begin by noting that it is possible (or so I have supposed throughout this work) for 
the nature of a thing ‘itself’ to involve another thing — this is just the phenomenon of 
ontological dependence (or, more specifically, of essential dependence). And this is 
precisely what is supposed to be the case here: the entities in the categories determined 
by a relation are ontologically dependent across the categorial divide. But does not this 
merely confront us with one horn of the above dilemma, the one on which there can be 
no relational distinction because there is ‘really’ no relation? For are not facts of 
ontological dependence, after all, fully grounded in the separate natures or ‘identities’ of 
the dependent items, so that there can at most be said to be a ‘supervenient’ internal 
relation here, something comparable to a similarity between two tropes? But let us also 
recall here a distinction I described above in 2.33, the one between ‘weakly’ and 
‘strongly’ internal relations, and what I said there about its possible import. I noted that 
Lowe, for example, hesitates to classify his instantiation and characterization — which 
are relations associated with ontological dependence, i.e. ‘strongly’ internal — alongside 
the likes of similarity, and thus as not ‘really’ relations at all; yet at the same time, Lowe 
denies separate ontological status to all formal ontological relations. It seems, in other 
words, that Lowe would prefer to have something both ways: true relations, truly 
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connecting things with each other, which are nevertheless ontologically nothing 
additional to their relata. 
 
To pass between the horns of the dilemma, and not merely to escape from one horn to the 
other, one needs, I believe, to show that something like the view that Lowe seems to hint 
at is possible. One needs to show that one can have ‘relational accounts’ of category 
distinctions without compromising either the intrinsicness of what one is accounting for 
or the ‘relationality’ of the account. Can this be done? Perhaps; here is one suggestion. 
Earlier I put it (following MacBride) that, when there is a relational account of a category 
distinction, the category of an entity is determined on the basis of its ‘occupying’ a certain 
‘position’ in a certain relation. This is a thoroughly misleading way of putting the matter 
if the relation is not to be construed as a distinct entity equipped with ‘positions’. There 
is nevertheless another way in which we could seek clarification here through the idea of 
something equipped with ‘positions’ or ‘argument places’. While it is standard to take 
‘unsaturated’ items, items with ‘argument places’, to require for their ‘saturation’ items 
that are themselves ‘saturated’ (having no ‘empty places’), there seems to be nothing 
incoherent in the idea of ‘reciprocal saturation’ — namely, in the idea that ‘unsaturated’ 
items could fill each other’s ‘empty places’ (perhaps the author of the Tractatus conceived 
of his ‘names’ and ‘objects’ like this; see e.g. Linsky 1992: 265–67). Now, if this is so, 
then why not conceive of entities the categorial nature of which is defined relationally in 
something like the following (frankly metaphorical) terms: the entities themselves have 
certain ‘ontological valencies’ which determine what other entities they must ‘combine’ 
with in order to exist; and these ‘valencies’ are in effect ‘argument places’ of a categorial 
relation, one in terms of which the categories of the matching entities are determined, as 
‘built into’ the entities themselves44. In this way, perhaps, we could have something that 
is ‘really’ a relation explain a category distinction without compromising the latter’s 
intrinsicness. 
 
Although I wouldn’t go as far as to claim that the above is how Lowe would propose to 
understand his instantiation and characterization relations, he does present some ideas 
                                                          
44
 ‘Unsaturatedness’ is perhaps in general to be understood in terms of the ‘incorporation’ of a relation 
into an entity. The point of ‘unsaturatedness’ could be taken to be that some relations must be ‘built in’, 
otherwise there will be an infinite regress. Frege writes that ‘the relation of subject to predicate is not a 
third thing added to the two, but it belongs to the content of the predicate, which is what makes the 
predicate unsaturated’ (quoted in Currie 1984: 333, my emphasis; also see Currie’s whole paper). 
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that seem to be very close. In a passage in Chapter 3 of his 2006, Lowe talks of the 
‘ontological forms of entities’ (2006: 48). These are described as having to do with the 
entities’ ‘place in the system of categories‘ and as determining the ‘ways of combining’ 
of the entities; these ‘ways of combining’ are further identified with the formal 
ontological relations, like instantiation and characterization, and are thus also taken to be 
‘no addition of being’ (loc. cit.). Lowe also presents a chemical analogy, comparing the 
combination of entities to the combination of chemical elements (loc.cit.).45  
 
An entity can well have several relations ‘built into’ it. The four categories in the OS, for 
example, are distinguished in terms of two relations, not just one. The categorial nature 
of entities in the four categories of Lowe’s system would perhaps be represented on the 
proposed view in something like the following way (1. = particular substance, 2. = mode, 
3. = characterizing universal, 4. = substantial universal): 
 
 1. x is instantiated by a which is characterized by y 
 2. x is characterized by b which instantiates y 
 3. x instantiates c which characterizes y 
 4. x characterizes d which is instantiated by y 
 
The incorporated relations should, by the way, be here viewed as ‘neutral’ (see K. Fine 
2000): although they are asymmetrical, they have no inherent direction. The four types of 
entity represented have themselves no direction, so that e.g. the ‘mirror images’ of the 
representations — in which the relational predicates part of the sign are replaced by their 
converses — represent exactly the same entities. For example 
 
 x is characterized by c which is instantiated by y 
 
is the same as 3 above. 
 
                                                          
45
 The passage, in fact, also seems to suggest that an entity has its ‘ontological form’ in virtue of its 
category, rather than the other way around. For Lowe writes: ‘The ontological form of an entity is 
provided by its place in the system of categories, for it is in virtue of a being’s category that it is suited or 
unsuited to combine in various ways with other beings of the same or different categories’ (2006: 48; my 
emphasis). Does this throw into doubt my interpretation of Lowe’s system as one in which the categories 
are defined in terms of their relations? As we have to go here by mere hints that Lowe gives in different 
places, it is perhaps best to say that both views are compatible with what Lowe says. 
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However, as I noted in 3.112 when discussing Aristotle’s version of OS, the relational 
connections in which a category of OS directly stands do not characterize it sufficiently, 
but we must, in effect, define it in terms of the whole relational structure of OS. Thus we 
will need in fact to incorporate the whole relational structure into each entity: 
 
 1. x is instantiated by a which is characterized by y which instantiates z 
 which characterizes w 
 
 2. x is characterized by b which instantiates y which characterizes z which 
 is instantiated by w 
 
 3. x instantiates c which characterizes y which is instantiated by z which is 
 characterized by w 
 
 4. x characterizes d which is instantiated by y which is characterized by z 
 which instantiates w 
 
I will, however, not try to develop the idea further here. 
 
What happens on the proposed view to the asymmetry objections? Are they gone or 
merely transformed? Our view makes entities into something like the ‘links of a chain’ 
of Wittgenstein’s well-known metaphor (TLP 2.03). Now, MacBride claims that when a 
fact is conceived as such a ‘chain’ — with its constituents ‘hanging together without 
benefit of a mediator’ — then it has no ‘asymmetric organization’ (MacBride 2004a: 
324). Indeed, do we not face the objection that ‘immediate connection’ obliterates 
asymmetry, even if we can, perhaps, insist that the relation itself is somehow retained 
(and so can answer the charge that no relation is involved to ‘account’ for anything)? But 
what was the reason the asymmetry was required, again? It was required so that the 
relation could provide a basis for distinguishing between the entities to which it applies 
in the first place. But now the categories are no longer taken to be determined 
‘relationally’ in terms of an ordering imposed ‘from the outside’, but rather in terms of 
the entities’ ‘intrinsic’ combinatorial ‘powers’. Reverting now to the simpler example of 
the particular-universal –distinction and the exemplification relation, the elements to be 
‘combined’ are no longer a, x exemplifies y, and b, but rather a exemplifies y and x 
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exemplifies b (although to put it in this way is somewhat misleading — this applies to the 
above linguistic representation of Lowe’s OS as well; the elements should not be viewed 
as partially saturated complexes produced from the previous three elements, but as simple 
entities — just as x exemplifies y is supposed to be simple, even if it, superficially at least, 
looks complex). Prima facie, a, x exemplifies y, and b can be combined in two different 
ways — namely into either a exemplifies b or into b exemplifies a  — and this is precisely 
why the question about asymmetry is raised. But when the simplest elements involved 
are a exemplifies y and x exemplifies b it seems that there is only one way to form a 
complex — namely, by letting each element fill the empty place in the other. But, of 
course, it is here merely taken for granted that the elements are not such that they could 
also be represented as x exemplifies a and b exemplifies y, respectively, or such that they 
would be correctly represented rather in this way. ‘Absorbing’ the relation into the relata 
decides once and for all these questions about asymmetry, but this is not an advantage of 
any kind if the questions are controversial.  
 
I take it that Lowe’s answer to MacBride’s objection concerning the ‘content’ of the 
asymmetry of his categorial relations is sufficient as far as it goes (see above). On the 
other hand, whether there really are such asymmetrical ‘dependency patterns’ etc. as 
Lowe claims in reality is indeed a contentious metaphysical question. What if the correct 
ontology turned out to be one of states of affairs — of particulars and universals —, one 
in which no such asymmetries in ontological dependence or any other are to be found? 
There would then seem to be no ground for taking the relation connecting particulars and 
universals to be asymmetrical; so the simplest view, one with the least arbitrariness 
involved, would thus seem to be to take the relation to be symmetrical (or perhaps non-
symmetrical). But then there could be no account of the distinction between universals 
and particulars in terms of the relation connecting them. Does this mean that it may turn 
out that there are categorial distinctions in the world which cannot be explained 
relationally? Well, it could be taken to mean that, but it could also be taken to mean that 
some prima facie category distinctions turn out, when correctly viewed (i.e. from the 
point of view of ‘ontological form’), to be empty of content. That is, we might as well 
take the impossibility of a relational account here to show that particulars and universals 
are not really categorially distinct. This view would even seem to be in the spirit of the 
Ramsey-MacBride –objections. The lesson to be learned from MacBride’s objection from 
the possibility of no asymmetry would then be, not that category distinctions cannot 
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always be explained relationally, but: so much the worse for those supposed category 
distinctions that cannot. 
 
I have not provided any arguments for the necessity of relational accounts of category 
distinctions; I have merely tried, in a rather small way, to defend their possibility. But if 
one were to argue in the above way, one would need to provide those arguments. Now, I 
do not know whether there is really a case to be made here. Nevertheless, I am at least 
inclined to believe that category distinctions should not be taken as ‘brute’ (I recognize 
that this probably goes quite a bit against the received wisdom concerning categories). If 
particulars and universals, for example, are to constitute genuinely distinct categories, the 
category of particulars must be, I think, more than merely different from or non-identical 
with the category of universals — that is, we should be able to say more than this about 
them. Because of this, some kind of ‘structuralism’, in which the categories are to be 
individuated in terms of a network of relations in which they are nodes, actually seems to 
me like an attractive option. Of course, one also must not simply suppose that there can 
be no non-relational differences between categories (although I must confess I at least 
have no idea what these would be). But looking at how different candidate ontological 
categories have been characterized, it is, I think, conspicuous how extensively such 
characterizations are based on relations. In addition to those that have been repeatedly 
used as examples in this work, spatiotemporal relations are, for example, often invoked 
(e.g. in the negative characterization of abstract entities as not located in space and time; 
see e.g. Hoffman and Rosenkrantz 1994, Appendix 1), perhaps combined with 
mereological ones (e.g. ‘continuants’ as having no temporal parts); causality provides 
another example (e.g. events as relata of causation and as individuated in terms of 
causality; see Davidson 1969). An exception, of course, would be provided by the 
characterization of the ‘root’ category in a ‘hierarchy of being’ type category system (as 
described in 3.111 above). But even there, no two categories are ever distinguished non-
relationally; the ‘root’ category is the lone exception. (One should also remember the fact 
that such ‘category structuralism’ would require there to be at least generic dependence 
between all entities; but this is not that heavy a requirement if we are talking about 
fundamental entities). 
 
The major trouble, nevertheless, with the idea of ‘category structuralism’ is that it is 
obscure how the relevant ‘structures’ should in general be understood. I am not 
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enthusiastic about (even if not completely against) taking there to be distinct relational 
entities corresponding to categorial relations or ‘structures’, and the idea that the 
categories of two entities could be determined by a distinct third entity seems in fact 
problematic anyway (for the same reason that the use of relations in general in accounting 
for the category of an entity seemed problematic above). Another way to conceive of 
‘categorial structures’ would be as some sorts of ‘organic wholes’ (if you will) of which 
entities would be ‘inseparable parts’. But this sounds like it would have very strong 
metaphysical consequences.  
 
Does the view of entities as ‘unsaturated’ I sketched above provide an alternative to these? 
On the view I sketched, entities are taken to be inherently ‘incomplete’; they involve in 
their very nature other entities; this ‘involvement’ is the categorial relation, associated 
with ontological dependence, by another name. It seems, however, that this view in effect 
collapses to the holistic ‘organic whole’ view46. For if one takes substances, kinds, modes, 
and properties (for example) all to be in themselves ‘incomplete’ in the way suggested, 
does not one thereby implicitly give some sort of priority to the complex units formed by 
these entities, perhaps even to the maximal complex that is the whole of reality? It may 
be noted that Lowe at least would probably not welcome such a consequence (although I 
am not claiming that Lowe would endorse the ‘incomplete entity’ view). First of all, he 
rejects views on which the ‘fundamental building blocks’ of reality are complexes like 
states of affairs (see e.g. 2006: 108, 128); secondly, although he seems to express some 
sympathy with monism, with taking reality as ‘one’ (2006: 191), I doubt he would be 
ready to give any sort of priority to the ‘one world’. 
 
Indeed, one seems to come dangerously close to taking substances, kinds, and the rest to 
be mere ’abstractions’ from a prior whole, whether this is understood as the whole of 
reality or as something like a state of affairs. But if what we thought were fundamental 
entities are in fact such ‘abstractions’ or ‘aspects’, what we seem to have in our hands is 
a version of the ‘hierarchy of being’ view, now with all four categories as derivative. In 
effect, Schaffer advocates just this type of view on which the whole is prior to its parts or 
                                                          
46
 Compare with Frege, with whom the ‘unsaturatedness’ of concepts is associated with the view that the 
judgment is prior to its ‘parts’; a judgment is not composed or ‘put together’ out of concepts and objects 
as prior elements, but these are instead arrived at through an analysis of the judgment as a prior unity (see 
Linsky 1992: 267–68). 
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‘aspects’. He takes the fundamental entity to be the whole cosmos from which a ‘that-
aspect’ and a ‘such-aspect’ (compare with the particular and the universal, respectively, 
of a state of affairs) can be ‘abstracted’ as derivative, non-fundamental entities (2009: 
379). Note also that when categories are defined in terms of their mutual relations, while 
it is certainly then true to say that they do not differ from each other with respect to 
fundamentality, it does not follow that they are all fundamental — they might all be non-
fundamental. 
 
*** 
 
Without doubt, much more would need to be said about these issues before definite 
conclusions about ‘relational accounts’ of categories or of ‘category structuralism’ could 
be drawn. Also, substantive metaphysical issues cannot be completely ignored, even if 
the issues we are concerned with are ‘metaontological’. As we saw, there are category 
distinctions which seem to be resistant to a ‘relational account’. And the reasons for 
believing in these category distinctions may very well outweigh the reasons for believing 
that categories must have a thoroughly relational nature. Another substantive issue that is 
important in the present connection is the metaphysics of relations. The idea that the 
essence of categories is relational depends on the coherence of the idea of (‘strongly’) 
internal relations. In fact, it seems that the metaphysics of internal and external relations 
is an issue foundational to all structuralism. But much work remains to be done in this 
area. 
 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
One of the major concerns of the metaphysician is, or should be, what the most basic 
types of entities — i.e. the categories — are. This work has explored some issues 
connected with ontological categories and category systems. One issue concerns the basis 
for ontological categorization: what do ontological categories classify by? Another way 
to put this question is: what makes a categorization ontological?  I suggested that the 
answer is to be found in taking ontology to be ‘formal ontology’: ontological categories 
categorize by ‘ontological form’. Another issue concerns relations between the 
categories. Categories form a system (and not just a classificatory one or a ‘taxonomy’), 
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they have connections with each other. Relations, ‘formal’ or ‘formal ontological’ ones, 
have also been central in formal ontology. I examined the idea, which I took to be 
plausible, that relations between categories are not only an important part of any category 
system but actually constitutive (somehow) of the categories themselves. Non-
taxonomical relations between categories are, properly speaking, relations between the 
entities in the categories. I took them to be certain kinds of ‘formal ontological relation’. 
As I also took categories to be essential to the entities in them, a ‘part of their nature’, the 
relations constitutive of the categories were taken also to be constitutive of the entities 
themselves. I supposed throughout that categories themselves are not entities. Thus, to 
say that categories are ‘really defined’ or constituted by the relations they stand in is an 
imperspicuous way of saying what is more perspicuously put by talking of the entities 
themselves in their categorial nature: e.g., an Aristotelian particular accident as such is 
(on one view) just something that is present in a primary substance; this relational 
connection constitutes the categorial nature of a particular accident, the nature of a 
particular accident qua particular accident (see 3.111). 
 
Another theme that recurred was that of fundamentality. This is because in the 
Introduction I endorsed the view that there are only fundamental entities, and 
consequently the view that ontological categories are categories of fundamental entities. 
My view of fundamentality was one based, in the first place, on the idea of truthmaking 
or on metaphysical necessitation. When ‘real definition’ was introduced, this view was 
somewhat modified. Nevertheless, I rejected distinct views of fundamentality that are 
wholly based on hyperintensional notions. 
 
If this work makes any original contribution, I suppose it is the idea of a specific sort of 
(what I have called) ‘category structuralism’. I am not aware of exactly similar (explicit) 
suggestions in the literature (However, Lowe does, at least on the interpretation given 
above, come close to formulating this sort of view; Peter Simons has also emphasized the 
importance of formal relations in category ontology, and of what is ‘behind the 
categories’ (Simons 2012: 131); it is the work of Lowe and Simons that originally made 
me think of categories from the point of their relations. Westerhoff (2005) is the only 
author I know who does hold an explicitly ‘structuralist’ view of ontological categories; 
his structures, however, are structures among states of affairs on the basis of which the 
categorized entities, their ‘constituents’, are defined – a rather different idea). On the other 
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hand, analogous views are prominent, for example, in the metaphysics of properties. 
Shoemaker (1980) and, more recently, e.g. Bird (2007) have suggested that properties are 
wholly individuated by the causal roles that they play. There is nothing more to properties 
than their causally relevant relations to each other. My suggestion about categories is 
similar: categories are nothing more than their (formal ontological) relations to each other. 
Of course, there are important disanalogies as well. For one, there are no such things as 
‘categories’ (on my view, at least), whereas ‘property structuralists’ at least tend to 
assume that there are properties. Categories are also essential to the entities in them; the 
corresponding claim in the case of properties is, on the other hand, much more 
controversial. For these reasons, my suggestion is in fact a suggestion of a ‘partial’ (but 
only ‘partial’) structuralism for all entities: the natures of entities insofar as they are of 
the categories they are (I recognize that much more needs to be said about the import of 
the ‘insofar as’ or ‘qua’ operator used here) are wholly constituted by certain mutual 
relations. It remains, however, to be seen whether a coherent view could actually be 
developed out of this sketchy suggestion (as I pointed out, it may also have some rather 
extensive general metaphysical consequences). 
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